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INTRODUCTION 
In 1830, Auguste Comte celebrated the failure of theology, the failure of metaphysics, 
and a rising scientific trend toward positivity — truly, humankind’s proclamation of omnipo-
tence over morals, God, and nature.
1
 One century later, the Earth became a battlefield for two 
World Wars, numerous violent conflicts, and a prolonged Cold War, the disrupting mistrust 
and tension of which continues to linger between the states to this day. The peacekeeper was 
supposed to be the international organization called the United Nations and the basis for peace 
was supposed to be its Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But an attentive person rec-
ognizes: something is not right. 
“Have Human Rights Treaties Failed?” asked the New York Times in December 
2014.
2
 Without sounding too skeptical, I quickly thought of an answer: that human rights trea-
ties are at least capable of failure, I have no doubt in.
3
 If history has taught us anything, it is 
not the ratification of endless international treaties that ensures peace, but the actual behavior 
of states respecting and enforcing those treaties that makes peace possible. It is not the League 
of Nations or the United Nations having power to change the world through the safety net of 
international law, but it is the sovereignty, autonomy, and real power, which is held by states, 
that are making a difference in international relations.
4
 One can proclaim its allegiance to the 
                                                          
1  . Comte.  ntroduction to Positive Philosophy  1  0 . F. Ferr  (ed). Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1988, pp 
3-4. 
2
 Have Human Rights Treaties Failed? The Opinion Pages. Room for Debate. A debate between Kenneth Roth 
and Eric A. Posner. — The New York Times. 28 December 2014. Available online: 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/12/28/have-human-rights-treaties-failed (04.04.2015). 
For Eric  . Posner’s in-depth contribution to the skeptical works in the field of human rights law, see: E. A. 
Posner. The Twilight of Human Rights Law. Inalienable Rights Series. Oxford, UK; New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2014. 
3
 Consider the passage by Harold Joseph Laski: “ n international Declaration of Human Rights must … take 
serious account of the fate of the Kellogg-Briand Pact which was introduced with an enthusiasm only surpassed 
by the contempt with which it was ignored by its signatories after the outbreak of the Italo-Abyssinian War. The 
danger is real that a Declaration, which is written in terms too far ahead of the probable practice of governments 
… will deepen the mood of cynicism and disillusion … .  t is at least doubtful whether we can afford to risk the 
deepening of this mood.” See: H. J. Laski. Toward a Universal Declaration of Human Rights. PHS/3 - IX - H. J. 
Laski. 15 June 1948. Available online: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001550/155041eb.pdf 
(04.04.2015), pp 8-9. 
Sociologist Jean Haesaert noted in a similar fashion: “[ ]ll the declarations which have played a part in modern 
history, from the 1776 Declaration of  ndependence down to the Fourth French Republic’s declaration of rights 
in 1946, have stumbled, mutatis mutandis, against similar difficulties. Their authors were unable, more particu-
larly, to solve the technical problem before them … . The freedom of the press has become the perquisite of a 
few magnates who, whatever one may say, make and unmake opinion. … Other provisions … have remained a 
dead letter. Equality has been reduced to the narrow civic equality that we know so well. … Resistance to op-
pression is hunted down wherever it appears, but oppression itself is flourishing, thanks to the crises which pur-
sue us, and it threatens rights the possessors of which have no means of defending themselves.” See: J. Haesaert. 
Reflections on Some Declarations of the Rights of Man. PHS/3 - XI - J. Haesaert. 15 June 1948. Available 
online: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001550/155041eb.pdf (04.04.2015), pp 1-2. 
4
 To this effect,  ldous Huxley wrote, “Mere paper restrictions, designed to curb the abuse of a power already 
5 
values listed in the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet the sobering 
thought, of course, is that there have been too many dissonances between the particular ac-
tions and the proclaimed values. 
In this work, I will draw on constructivism and legal realism to propose an original le-
gal understanding of some dissonant events of the recent past that concerned ideological ex-
ploitation of human rights. Due to limitations of space, only the following events will be 
touched upon later in this work: I will remind the reader of the Norway attacks of 2011 and 
the dissonances surrounding the perpetrator Anders Behring Breivik; I will briefly describe 
the Ukrainian crisis (2013 — ongoing), focusing, in particular, on Ukrainian lustration policy; 
I will zoom in onto the Crimean crisis (2014 — ongoing) and the surrounding dissonance be-
tween the statements of the press and the political statements; finally, to show the dissonances 
surrounding the freedom of expression,
5
 I will turn the reader’s attention to the controversial 
March 2015 Southampton Conference on Israel’s right to exist. 
These few events bring into attention a whole array of problems, which necessitate a 
timely understanding and resolution if we wish to continue our existence as democratic socie-
ties based on the rule of law. The problem in the focus of the present inquiry can be summa-
rized by what professor Eric A. Posner named “the vast ideological appeal of human rights,” 
noting that human rights talk has “become the lingua franca for political action.”6 As a result 
of such ideology-driven activism, political action causes fundamental dissonances on different 
levels of human interaction. For the purposes of this work, I discerned four levels of human 
and state interaction: intra-personal,
7
 intra-state, inter-state, and inter-personal. The range of 
questions for potential research is broad. 
1. For example, at the intra-personal level, what should be the measurement of con-
sistency of one’s actions with the rule of law? What happens if a person exploits 
human rights and freedoms to the severe detriment of others — and is mere 
utilitarianistic approach to balance the harms adequate?  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
concentrated in a few hands, are but the mitigations of an existing evil.” See:  . Huxley. The Rights of Man and 
the Facts of the Human Situation. PHS/3 - XXII - A. Huxley. 15 June 1948. Available online:  
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001550/155041eb.pdf (04.04.2015), p 4. 
5
 I could also have discussed the events of Paris on 7 January 2015 and the tragic Charlie Hebdo shooting that 
took place on that date, but in the interests of space and originality, I made a choice toward the more recent and 
less obvious event. For the discussion surrounding the Charlie Hebdo shooting of 2015, see, e.g.: G. Packer. The 
Blame for the Charlie Hebdo Murders. — The New Yorker. 7 January 2015. Available online: 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/blame-for-charlie-hebdo-murders (04.04.2015); A. Lane. Shooting 
the Jesters. — The New Yorker. 8 January 2015. Available online: 
http://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/shooting-jesters (04.04.2015). 
6
 E. A. Posner. The Human-Rights Charade. — Chronicle of Higher Education, 2014/61(12). 
7
 In this work, intra-personal interaction is taken to mean the mental processing activity of self-reflection. Cf: D. 
O. Brink. Prudence and Authenticity: Intrapersonal Conflicts of Value. — The Philosophical Review, 
2003/112(2), pp 215-245. 
6 
2. At the intra-state level, are human rights also prone to ideological exploitation? In 
this work, I have used the following example to discuss the intra-state level: gov-
ernment’s lustration policy and the ideological motivation behind that.  
3. At the inter-state level, is violation of human rights in country A a sufficient justifi-
cation for country B to intervene – if necessary, with violence – in the affairs of 
country A? Such was the critique by John Tasioulas who noted that the concept of 
human rights is “contested enough” but nevertheless is used as “pro tanto justifia-
bility of international intervention against states that commit rights violations.”8  
4. Finally, at the inter-personal level, for example, what could be the limits of one’s 
own actions? Should offense or disgust
9
 be considered harm to others, and how 
would one weigh these against the freedoms of the source of action? In the interest 
of space, in the analysis at the inter-personal level, I will focus only on the phe-
nomenon of free speech becoming offensive. 
As far as the topic of ideological exploitation is concerned, above were listed only 
some of the questions which are yet without a satisfactory answer, at least within the Estonian 
academia. I will not analyze all related questions of ideological exploitation in detail, but I 
will map out the theoretical background and propose my own theory of four levels of funda-
mental dissonances to understand these types of ideological exploitations of human rights. 
Ultimately, I will have the following hypothesis to disprove. 
The hypothesis that I will falsify is the cautious conjecture
10
 that the concept of uni-
versal human rights is not prone to ideological exploitation. To falsify this hypothesis, it 
would be necessary to find at least one instance where the universal concept of human rights 
was exploited for the purposes of ideology. In this work, I will present four such instances 
from four different levels: intra-personal, intra-state, inter-state, and inter-personal; the latter 
two being especially important in the context of international law. By employing a method of 
qualitative inquiry,
11
 describing the factual narrative from an analytical standpoint, I will 
reach the following conclusion: the universal concept of human rights is prone to ideological 
exploitation, and such ideological exploitation has taken place during many recent events that 
                                                          
8
 J. Tasioulas. Are Human Rights Essentially Triggers for Intervention? — Philosophy Compass, 2009/4(6), p 
947. 
9
 For instance, philosopher Martha C. Nussbaum may be consulted as one authority on the topic of law and dis-
gust. See: M. C. Nussbaum. Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law. Princeton; Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2006. 
10
 The phrase is borrowed from  lan F. Chalmers who argued that “contributions to the growth of scientific 
knowledge come about either when a bold conjecture is confirmed or when a cautious conjecture is falsified.” 
See: A. F. Chalmers. What is this Thing Called Science? An Assessment of the Nature and Status of Science and 
Its Methods. (1976). St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1999, p 82. 
11
 H. L. Goodall. Writing Qualitative Inquiry: Self, Stories, and Academic Life. Walnut Creek: Left Coast, 2008. 
7 
had a disruptive effect on the whole world.
12
 
It is apparent to me that the subject of the present work could not have been more 
timely. In fact, as I started to work on the first drafts of my thesis, I began to notice more and 
more disturbing instances of ideological exploitation of human rights. Perhaps, these were the 
unfortunate geopolitical and intra-national tensions of the present time that caused such 
events, but perhaps it was merely my mind becoming more aware of the issue at hand. In any 
case, to eliminate a sense of uncertainty when observing complex political events and to elim-
inate the naivet  around universality of human rights, there is a timely need for a useful theo-
retical framework.  
As far as the limits of jurisdictional scope of this work are concerned, I did not intend 
this thesis to be an interpretation of one particular legal system but rather a generalization at a 
theoretical level of some examples of the human rights discourse taken from different systems 
and jurisdictions. Naturally, I will draw some examples from Estonian law, particularly, con-
cerning the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia. But mostly, I will be speaking of interna-
tional law. There is an immense body of examples to choose from to discuss the legal frame-
work of human rights; there is much to improve, and to critique. In short, there is much un-
covered ground, which lies beyond the ambit of this work. In writing this thesis, I narrowed 
my focus; collected and listed only some of the most striking examples of seemingly unrelat-
ed factual circumstances, and used them in synergy to advance my argument; hopefully, in a 
way that has not been done previously at the place of my alma mater, the University of Tartu, 
Estonia. 
My hope is that this work would be considered an original contribution to the interna-
tional human rights law and to the legal philosophy works produced in the legal academia of 
Estonia. Unfortunately, in Estonia, there are not that many academic works in the field of hu-
man rights law.
13
 Over the years, I have been left with a morbid perception that whilst human 
                                                          
12
 For the avoidance of doubt, I will not conclude that human rights system has been useless. To quote Radhika 
Coomaraswamy: “ t one level, even in multilateral fora, the discourse of human rights is being challenged by 
powerful member states and some theorists from the developing world. At another level, human rights have 
begun to inform the lives of so many people, invoked by citizens and communities everywhere whenever they 
feel that freedom or justice is being denied.” See: R. Coomaraswamy. The Contemporary Challenges to  nterna-
tional Human Rights. — S. Sheeran and Sir N. Rodley (eds). Routledge Handbook of International Human 
Rights Law. New York: Routledge, 2013, p 127. 
13
 In particular, there are no academic works in Estonia on ideological exploitation of human rights. The most 
closely related to the topic of this thesis is Varro Vooglaid’s article, which was critically directed against the 
overly-naïve human rights rhetoric. Cf  in Estonian : V. Vooglaid. Hukutab või päästab?  nimõiguste retoorika 
ebaterve toime headuse idee väljendamisele. — Acta Societatis Martensis, 2005/1, pp 121-138.  
In addition, there are some general local works on international law, on natural law, and on human rights in spe-
cific contexts. To pick the most relevant example, Daniel Kaasik’s bachelor’s thesis gave an overview of the 
effects of natural law in the modern international law, but has designated only two pages to the topic of human 
rights and concluded that human rights are intrinsically related to natural law.  n contrast, in my master’s thesis,   
will argue against that conclusion, because universal human rights as envisaged by the Universal Declaration of 
8 
rights are important for lawyers in principle, many practitioners do not perceive legal writing 
or reading on the topic of human rights as worthwhile. Generally, three reasons are brought 
out not to spend time on writing or reading on human rights: (1) the far distance of the topic 
from real practice, (2) minimal usability of such knowledge, and (3) impracticality of such 
knowledge. There are, of course, notable exceptions, such as the works of Professor Lauri 
Mälksoo whom   hold in very high regard. Moreover, the negative attitude toward the human 
rights discourse in Estonia has been probably tendered a bit due to the nearby Ukrainian crisis 
(2013 — ongoing). Nonetheless, a negative attitude seems to prevail for the afore-mentioned 
reasons. Below, I will briefly describe these critiques, bearing in mind that my acknowledg-
ment of such critique does not render the human rights discourse meaningless but rather 
makes it more important to address these issues. 
First, (1) almost none of the Estonian practitioners rely on the human rights discourse 
in their everyday practice, unless, for example, they are human rights activists campaigning 
for the rights of the minorities.
14
 The same, in fact, can be said about the majority of lawyers 
rarely encountering questions of international law or supranational law.
15
 In the area of pri-
vate law, for example, a legal specialist, be it an attorney-at-law, the notary public, or an in-
house corporate counsel, has time within the hectic nature of legal work to only deal and ana-
lyze the client’s situation at hand and to answer the client’s specific questions, which probably 
concern not human rights but matters of everyday business and profitability.
16
 Some lawyers 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Human Rights have little to do with natural law. See  in Estonian : D. Kaasik. Loomuõiguse mõjud kaasaegses 
rahvusvahelises õiguses: bakalaureusetöö. Juhendaja Lauri Mälksoo. Tallinn: Tartu Ülikool, 2009, pp   -39. 
14
 On this note, perhaps the human rights discourse in Estonia is scarce because human rights violations are gen-
erally associated only with gross violations such as genocide, disappearances, and torture. However, I agree with 
Richard L. Siegel who wrote, “ t is not difficult to understand [that many issues are generally ignored in the 
sphere of international human rights law] given such concerns of international human rights activists as geno-
cide, political prisoners, disappearances, and torture. These conjure up perceptions of wholesale murder and the 
depths of inhumanity to man, woman and child.   would not dream of denigrating the centrality of such “gross 
violations” of fundamental human rights, some of which led directly to significant advances in the international 
machinery designed to forestall their repetition and perpetuation. Yet the study of international human rights 
broadens one’s thinking and raises consciousness about less obvious issues even as it deepens knowledge and 
commitment about known outrages.” See: R. L. Siegel. Employment and Human Rights: The International Di-
mension. United States of America: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994, pp 3-4. 
15
 However, in Estonia, Hent Kalmo has suggested that the effect of European Union law has been noticed at 
least to some degree by all practicing lawyers. Cf: H. Kalmo. Euroopa Liidu õiguse ootamatud mõjud. — 
Juridica, 2015/II, pp 71-76. 
See also, e.g.: Y. Ahmed. Why every aspiring lawyer should study international law. — The Guardian. 8 April 
2015, 09:53 BST. Available online: http://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/apr/08/aspiring-lawyers-
international-law (04.04.2015). 
16
 For instance, the attorney’s engagement letter, or the attorney’s agreement with the client, usually specifies the 
scope of the billable work done for the client in great detail, understandably, for the client not to accuse the at-
torney of doing unnecessary expensive work, and rarely would a client wish for an analysis of something as 
ephemeral as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In fact, even the biggest law firms in the world do not 
list on their websites “human rights law” as an independent area of practice, but, at most, advertise “public inter-
national law” focusing on assistance with negotiation of trade treaties and on other commercial aspects of public 
international law. 
9 
like criminal law specialists, certain administrative workers, and police force personnel do 
have some connection to the area of protection of human rights, but they, too, do not have the 
time within their usual work to go too much in depth beyond what, for example, the Constitu-
tion or the Penal Code were intended to regulate. Moreover, since for a post-Soviet state the 
re-establishment of a working legal system is a priority, perhaps the disregard of such ephem-
eral notions as philosophy surrounding human rights is trumped by a general focus on legal-
ism and positive law.
17
 Thus, Estonian academics have little motivation to write on the topic, 
since for a young state like Estonia that is recovering from the stagnation of the Soviet idea of 
economy, there are, crudely speaking, more profitable topics to write or to read about.
18
  
Second, (2) the usefulness of the present concept of human rights, as was defined by 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is prone to heavy critique. The concept of human 
rights is too general and too abstract. The practitioners in Estonia in their everyday work do 
not even have to turn to the catalogue of human rights, because usually the most general legal 
act to turn to is the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, which already contains a compre-
hensive list of fundamental rights, obligations, and freedoms, and the application of which 
requires deep knowledge of Estonian constitutional law. The comparison of the list of these 
domestic fundamental rights, obligations, and freedoms, to the general list of international 
human rights is not only unnecessary in practice, but also difficult, since there is no exhaus-
tive and unambiguous list of international human rights. Certainly, the pretense to universal 
exhaustiveness and power may have been envisaged in international legal acts such as the 
European Convention on Human Rights, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union, especially after the Treaty of Lisbon;
19
 but the reality is that these international 
human rights instruments are “living creatures”, the interpretation of which is open to change 
and thus to the influence of prevailing ideologies. 
Third, (3) speaking of international legal acts, not only the concept of human rights 
                                                          
17
 See, e.g. (the critique of Estonian legalism by economist and politician Uno Mereste; in Estonian): U. Mereste. 
Legalismi ilminguist majanduspoliitikas ja õigusloomes.  1994 . — U. Mereste. Õigusloome radadel. 
Õigusalaseid artikleid. Tallinn: Juura, 2001, pp 34-41. 
18
 But cf, e.g. (many argue, that respect for and enforcement of human rights is a necessary pre-condition for 
sustainable development of the market economy, employment, and international trade): S. Leader. Human Rights 
and International Trade. — S. Sheeran and Sir N. Rodley (eds). Routledge Handbook of International Human 
Rights Law. New York: Routledge, 2013, pp 245-262; P. T. Muchlinski. International Finance and Investment 
and Human Rights. — S. Sheeran and Sir N. Rodley (eds). Routledge Handbook of International Human Rights 
Law. New York: Routledge, 2013, pp 263-284; L. A. Compa and S. F. Diamond (eds). Human Rights, Labor 
Rights, and International Trade. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996; L. Swepston. The Interna-
tional Labour Organization and International Human Rights System. — S. Sheeran and Sir N. Rodley (eds). 
Routledge Handbook of International Human Rights Law. New York: Routledge, 2013, pp 339-352; F. Garcia. 
The Global Market and Human Rights: Trading Away the Human Rights Principle. — Brooklyn Journal of In-
ternational Law, 1999/25(1), pp 51-98. 
19
 K. Nyman-Metcalf. The Future of Universality of Rights. — S. de Vries, U, Bernitz, S. Weatherill (eds). The 
Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU After Lisbon. Oxford; Portland: Hart Publishing, 2013, p 21. 
10 
has been the object of criticism, but also the international legal acts per se. If critics name the 
international human rights convention a “toothless beast,”20 it also undermines the credibility 
of the human rights system in general. For example, different international human rights con-
ventions may not be in total harmony with each other and instead may have different scopes 
and important differences in content.
21
 This also undermines the authority of organs applying 
these conventions as sources of international human rights law. For instance, some states are 
especially reluctant to observe the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and in-
stead may send heavy critique in the Court’s address.22 Despite the supposedly good inten-
tions behind the human rights system, there are many decisions that the member states of the 
conventions are not happy with. In my view, thus, without a strong universal foundation, the 
human rights system is prone to collapse under its own weight. 
Likewise, for the works in the field of philosophy of law, the threshold of originality, 
it seems to me, is presently also not that high in Estonia. The afore-mentioned reasons for 
critique of the human rights discourse — (1) the far distance of the topic from real practice, 
(2) minimal usability of such knowledge, and (3) impracticality of such knowledge — are, in 
fact, also addressable against the philosophy of law. Philosophy is considered the practice of 
                                                          
20
 For example, Paul F. Diehl and Charlotte Ku argued in the following manner: “Support for normative change 
can largely be for symbolic reasons (e.g., the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), but with-
out substantive impact. Leading states might support human rights norms, for example, while also opposing 
individual standing before international bodies and other operating changes that would facilitate the observance 
of the norm.” See: P. F. Diehl and C. Ku. The Dynamics of  nternational Law. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010, p 83. 
21
 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union goes, for example, far beyond the scope of previ-
ous international human rights treaties. See, e.g.: K. Nyman-Metcalf. The Future of Universality of Rights. — S. 
de Vries, U. Bernitz, S. Weatherill (eds). The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU After Lisbon. Oxford; 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2013, p 21. 
But cf (even though in 1948 human rights were defined broadly, the juridification of human rights happened 
much later and elevated the ability to claim rights in courts, known as justiciability, to a constitutive element 
without which a right could not be considered as belonging to human rights : W. Osiatyński. The Historical 
Development of Human Rights. — S. Sheeran and Sir N. Rodley (eds). Routledge Handbook of International 
Human Rights Law. New York: Routledge, 2013, p 18.  
A point that human rights regulation is only effective when the human rights are justiciable is daunting. None-
theless, even if access to court is available, there may be a problem with enforcement of the court’s decision. 
Such was the resistance within the Inter-American system of human rights. See, e.g.: C. Sandoval. The Inter-
American System of Human Rights and Approach. — S. Sheeran and Sir N. Rodley (eds). Routledge Handbook 
of International Human Rights Law. New York: Routledge, 2013, pp 441-442; A. Huneeus. Courts Resisting 
Courts: Lessons from the Inter- merican Court’s Struggle to Enforce Human Rights. — Cornell International 
Law Journal, 2011/44(3), p 495. 
22
 For a long time, the obvious example has been the United Kingdom. See: O. Bowcott. Conservatives pledge 
powers to ignore European court of human rights rulings. — The Guardian. 3 October 2014, 08:14 BST. Availa-
ble online: http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/oct/03/conservatives-ignore-european-court-human-rights-
rulings (04.04.2015). 
See also, e.g. (the case of Russia; in Russian : А. Колесниченко, З. Титова. Страсбург - не указ. — Новые 
Известия, 11 March 2010.  vailable online:  
http://www.newizv.ru/society/2010-03-11/123088-strasburg-ne-ukaz.html  04.04.2015 ; Путин похвалил 
Конституционный суд: научился “корректно” игнорировать решения ЕСПЧ. — NewsRu.com, 13 Decem-
ber 2013, 13:52, updated on 17 December 2013, 09:12. Available online:  
http://www.newsru.com/russia/13dec2013/konstituz.html (04.04.2015). 
11 
logical reasoning that can also be done only in one’s armchair. In a society that is applauding 
anything based on statistics and empiricism, such armchair science seems useless, perhaps as 
was also analogously the case with any intellectual activity in the Union of the Soviet Social-
ist Republics. Even though the Republic of Estonia is nowadays clearly turned West instead 
of East, certain effects of the mentality of the past sometimes prevail even in the academia. 
The practice of philosophy requires strict adherence to the methods of logical reasoning, and 
requires vast knowledge and deep understanding of previous thinkers.
23
 Moreover, the credi-
bility of philosophy is undermined in the present-time Estonia because of the misconception 
that philosophy has ceased to be a proper science and was replaced by “philosophizing” in the 
pejorative sense of the word. Often, the ideas of philosophers were much ahead of their time, 
just like, for example, Peter Abelard was considered to be a modern philosopher who time-
traveled to the medieval times.
24
 Sometimes, of course, it was the consequence of philoso-
phers themselves that they were too difficult to understand, as was the case, for example, with 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.
25
 
Ultimately, however, philosophy of law is the most fundamental of all legal sciences, 
because philosophical reflection is the safeguard against ignorance of unjust decisions which, 
at face value, may seem formally correct.
26
 
Moreover, the philosophical focus on the underlying fundamental questions is the only 
approach to legal education that is truly timeless and practical in a sense that it is enabling the 
educators to teach a student of law the important skills of critical thinking. I cast no doubt that 
there is a certain time and place for the dogmatic approach. There is a certain value for the 
academic institution in being able to produce a student who is able to find his or her own way 
through the current legal system. Yet at the same time, such approach risks producing lawyers 
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 To quote Bertrand Russell: “Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its ques-
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who are not critical enough of the current legal system, because the dogmatic approach over-
estimates the importance of positive legal texts and of recent court decisions, while disregard-
ing anything historic as irrelevant, anything philosophical as impractical, and anything per-
taining to sociology, psychology, or linguistics as pertaining to practically unrelated disci-
plines of science.
27
 The reality is that, at the time of finalizing this thesis, the State Gazette of 
the Republic of Estonia, currently being published exclusively in an online format, hosted the 
texts of over 4000 legal acts currently in force, over 500 legal acts to be entered into force in 
near future, and over 6000 legal acts not in force any longer,
28
 and this shows inevitably, first, 
the limitation of the dogmatic approach, and second, its feebleness as far as the amendments 
to legal texts are concerned.
29
 
In contrast, the fundamental questions, which only a philosopher of law could be con-
stantly aware of, do help to have a more all-encompassing view of the object of the scientific 
inquiry. Therefore, it is my hope, that with the passing of time we will see a disappearance of 
the popular negative perception that a legal philosopher is being an impractical           (a 
pejorative legal term in the criminal code of the 1961-1991 Soviet Russia that condemned 
persons unwilling to do physical work).  
For me to be able to write this work as a culmination of my master’s studies at the 
University of Tartu, I am very grateful to my friends, family, the helpful workers at the Uni-
versity of Tartu, and my supervisor. Not less importantly, I am grateful to all lecturers at the 
University of Tartu Faculty of Law and to all authors cited in this work — one can see much 
farther while standing on the shoulders of giants.  
For the avoidance of any doubt, in writing this work, I was guided by the principle of 
objectivity and all viewpoints expressed here are my own. Particularly, I am grateful to Mr. 
Vooglaid,
30
 whom I hold in very high regard as a talented lecturer, for trusting me with con-
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expected under the Soviet rule. 
30
 To my surprise, during the writing of this thesis, I have found the Estonian mass media to be severely attack-
ing Mr. Varro Vooglaid, because Mr. Vooglaid was and currently is the main voice and the member of the man-
agement board at the Estonian non-governmental organization “SA Perekonna ja Traditsiooni Kaitseks”  in 
English: Foundation for Defense of Family and Tradition), that, among other things, publicly opposed the emo-
tionally-laden and gender-neutral Kooseluseadus (in English: Cohabitation Act), which was introduced in 
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duct of all individual research and for academic freedom that I have been able to enjoy.  
A short remark is due regarding the choice of language for this work. To choose Eng-
lish for this work was not an easy decision; in the University of Tartu, the default language to 
use is, of course, Estonian, and for the small state of Estonia, the preservation of Estonian 
language through the generations is one of the top priorities that are even put down in writing 
in the preamble of our Constitution.
31
 However, without a doubt, the lingua franca of the legal 
academic world is at the present time the English language, for understandable reasons of 
global popularity and recent tradition. Consider the language dilemma as described in the vi-
sionary edition of the booklet published by the University of Tartu: “Do we or do we not want 
to participate in top scientific work — that is a clear dilemma”; contrasted to the fear that Es-
tonian-speaking intellectuals will cease to respect the Estonian language.
32
 Thankfully, I hold 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Riigikogu (the Estonian parliament) in April 2014. The aggressive media campaign made it seem as though the 
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as the birthplace for the global same-sex rights activists. Without affirming my supervisor’s position on the mat-
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the Estonian language, literature, and culture in very high regard, I have written many course 
works in Estonian, and in the future I plan to write academic works in Estonian if the reader-
ship would be limited only to the borders of Estonia. For this work, however, I have chosen 
the more international approach. 
Another short remark should be made regarding my choice of tone for this work. I am 
aware that in the academia there is a general conventional disapproval of writing in the first 
person. However, in my view, it is unrealistic to expect, that merely by writing of oneself in 
the third person or even avoiding the mention of the author, the subjectivity bias would be 
automatically quashed. Instead, for the sake of clarity, in this work I have consciously differ-
entiated between writing in the first person versus writing in the third person. Whenever writ-
ing concerned my own interpretations and arguments, I stated so.
33
 However, whenever I was 
describing the facts, the objective circumstances or logical inferences, I used the third person. 
In my view, it should be possible to preserve an academic style of writing without jeopardiz-
ing clarity and readability, because plain English is often better for the academic argumenta-
tion purposes.
34
 This kind of condensed clarity is what I was striving for in writing this thesis. 
For this purpose of clearer academic writing, I have found to be indispensable Jean-Luc 
Lebrun’s book “Scientific Writing”35 and the Academic Phrasebank of the University of 
Manchester.
36
 
To finish the introduction, I will explain the structure of the later sections. Since there 
is no set convention on how to structure one’s master’s thesis, I have used this opportunity to 
structure this work according to the functions of each section: methodological, theoretical, 
and factually-analytical. For my understanding of the importance of theoretical and methodo-
logical sections,   am forever grateful to the renowned Estonian scientist Mr. Ülo Vooglaid 
whose methodology of science course at the University of Tartu Faculty of Law in years 
2009/2010 has remained very memorable to me. Likewise, American sociologist Robert King 
Merton has similarly defended the importance of methodological awareness: “Sociologists, in 
company with all others who essay scientific work, must be methodologically wise; they must 
be aware of the design of investigation, the nature of inference, the requirements of a theoretic 
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system.”37 However, the same is true for the field of legal studies; for instance, the importance 
of justification of one’s jurisprudential arguments has been convincingly underscored by the 
Finnish jurist Aulius Aarnio.
38
 
Below, thus, Section 1 will describe the methodological background for this work. 
Section 2 will describe and discuss the applied theories and, in particular, used concepts, bor-
rowings from other disciplines, and the legal paradigm. Section 3 will describe the analyzed 
factual framework that I have used to falsify the posed hypothesis at the four levels: intra-
personal, intra-state, inter-state, and inter-personal. Since the latter two levels are in my view 
in terms of international law more important than the former two levels, I accorded the inter-
state and inter-personal levels more attention. Finally, after the concluding section and ac-
cording to the internal regulations at the University of Tartu, I provided an Estonian abstract 
for this work. 
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1. METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES FOR UNDERSTANDING  
IDEOLOGICAL EXPLOITATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
1.1. Interdisciplinarity 
First and foremost, I have approached the analysis in this work from an interdiscipli-
nary viewpoint.
39
 By ‘interdisciplinarity’ I mean my awareness of the possible interplay be-
tween different disciplines in the field of social studies. According to James B. Rule’s account 
of Talcott Parsons’ contribution to the social sciences, the aggregate amount of knowledge 
produced by the social sciences may be viewed as a system that is similar to the periodical 
system of chemical elements, with new elements being added as the new discoveries or un-
derstandings are made.
40
 Perhaps, this kind of understanding allows us to refute Paul 
Feyerabend’s anarchistic contention that science is best practiced with no adherence to a spe-
cific method;
41
 when the approach is inspired by many different fields of science, the risk of 
having one’s scientific field-of-vision too narrow is not increased, but, to the contrary, de-
creased. 
Therefore, in the large sense, no inquiry in the field of social studies would be com-
plete without borrowings from the historical, anthropological, sociological, and psychological 
realms. In the more narrow sense, the interdisciplinarity is also warranted between such close-
ly related fields of studying law as sociology of law, psychology of law, history of law, phi-
losophy of law.
42
 Importantly, from the outset, I have adopted what sociologist Charles 
Wright Mills called the sociological imagination: 
The sociological imagination is becoming, I believe, the major common 
denominator of our cultural life and its signal feature. This quality of 
mind is found in the social and psychological sciences, but it goes far be-
yond these studies as we now know them. Its acquisition by individuals 
and by the cultural community at large is slow and often fumbling; many 
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social scientists are themselves quite unaware of it. They do not seem to 
know that the use of this imagination is central to the best work that they 
might do … .43 
Moreover, being concerned with such concepts as ideological exploitation and human 
rights, the present work has been inspired also by the realist constructivism research in the 
field of international relations and politics, the disregard of which in a legal work would be 
naive, since law does not exist in a vacuum separate from other areas of life. Particularly, 
from a realist constructivism perspective it is precisely the politics and the international rela-
tions that shape the content of law, mostly at the level of international law, but indirectly also 
at the domestic level.  
Thus, from the outset of my work, I have adopted an awareness that law does not exist 
in a vacuum and that some ideas of great psychologists, sociologists and political scientists 
may be well borrowed to explain the ideological exploitation of human rights. That is the no-
tion of interdisciplinarity that I have first and foremost been guided by in writing the present 
work. 
 
1.2. Falsificationism 
The purpose of the present inquiry was to disprove the hypothesis set out in the begin-
ning: that the concept of universal human rights is not prone to ideological exploitation. Falsi-
fication is thus the second fundamental methodological approach used in this work.  
Verificationism, according to Karl Popper, is an exercise in futility, because empirical 
facts collected to confirm the set hypothesis do not guarantee that the hypothesis would not 
ever be disproved.
44
 There is some place for and value in verificationism, although the true 
criteria for a theory to be considered scientific are, according to Karl Popper, the theory’s 
ability to be falsified or disproved.
45
 Thus, empirical and factual data should be used mostly 
for the purpose of falsification of the set hypotheses and not to confirm them. 
However, I have not used empirical data as a safe haven for scientism. In my view, 
empirical data is not an end but only the means of conducting scientific work. Sometimes, 
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quantitative analysis or abstract empiricism is valued more than qualitative analysis. Howev-
er, quantitative analysis is not prone to subjective biases, especially for the inexperienced 
scholars. Sociologist Charles Wright Mills criticized the use of abstracted empiricism;
46
 he 
blisteringly wrote of the often selfish and misguided goals of social empiricists: 
In the discourse of the more sophisticated, or in the presence of some 
smiling and exalted physicist, the self-image [of the social studies empir-
icist] is more likely to be shortened [from social scientist] to merely ‘sci-
entist’.47  
Thus, in conducting my research for the present work instead of, for example, creating 
surveys, I only relied on the analysis of a handful of controversial factual events. I have con-
ducted what may be characterized as post factum analysis, without any pretense to prediction 
of future events. Consider Charles Wright Mills criticizing this popular purpose of social stud-
ies, the prediction of human behavior, comparing such purpose to Karl Marx’s idea, that the 
world was meant to be manipulated: 
Among the slogans used by a variety of schools of social science, none is 
so frequent as, ‘The purpose of social science is the prediction and con-
trol of human behavior’ … . They are, they suppose, out to do with socie-
ty what they suppose physicists have done with nature. … The use of 
such phrases reveals a rationalistic and empty optimism which rests upon 
an ignorance of the several possible roles of reason in human affairs, the 
nature of power and its relations to knowledge, the meaning of moral ac-
tion and the place of knowledge within it, the nature of history and the 
fact that men are not only creatures of history but on occasion creators 
within it and even of it.
48
 
Thus, in conducting the present research, I have not set out “to manipulate the world,” 
but rather to propose one out of many possibilities to understand the ideological exploitation 
of human rights. 
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND FOR UNDERSTANDING IDEOLOGICAL  
EXPLOITATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
From philosophy and logic we are accustomed with the following axiom: one cannot 
make an inference from nothing.
49
 In other words, nothing can be born ex nihilo,
50
 and such is 
also the reasoning behind my decision to describe in detail the theoretical background for this 
work, especially given the fact that I am proposing a theory of my own to understand funda-
mental dissonances within international human rights law. In other words, to quote Jeanne 
Fahnestock and Marie Secor: “You would not even bother to read an argument written by 
someone who betrayed fundamental ignorance on the subject.”51 
Below, thus, I will first shortly describe my understanding of important concepts
52
 that 
concern the subject of my thesis: law, political manipulations, ideology, power, individualism, 
freedom and sovereignty, and human rights. Nevertheless, I did not set out to comprehensive-
ly define complex concepts, since such concepts as human rights or ideology do not have a 
direct antonym, and such terms do not have easily definable limits. 
Second, I will explain the interdisciplinary links that I have made in this thesis by ref-
erence to Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonances, and Robert King Merton’s socio-
logical strain theory. At first glance, psychology and sociology have little do to with interna-
tional law, yet, in my view, the reasoning behind the theories of these scientists may be ap-
plied analogously to the understanding of the complex facts and dilemmas of the ideological 
exploitation of human rights. 
Third, I will describe legal approaches used in the analysis of the factual background: 
legal realism, hierarchy of rights, and the view of human rights as principles. In a general 
sense, this is the scientific paradigm
53
 in Thomas Kuhn’s sense of the word that I approached 
the legal analysis of the ideological exploitation of human rights with.
54
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2.1. Elaboration on Main Concepts and on Their Weaknesses 
As a preliminary remark, I should explain the reason of defining in the following sub-
sections the major concepts related to this thesis. What sociologist Charles Wright Mills 
meant when he said that “[g]rand theory is drunk on syntax, blind to semantics,”55 is that def-
initions should not be the end in themselves and that social scientists, including legal academ-
ics, should be aware of the level of abstractness they are operating on.
56
 After all, many of the 
major concepts have complex factual backgrounds underlying them and have thus naturally 
ambiguous semantic limits. The limits set by the scientist may thus seem artificial and con-
trived and may lead, instead of problem resolution which was the original focus of the scien-
tist’s work, to further inquiry and argument over the object of definition. For this purpose, I 
have not set out as purpose of this thesis to propose a ‘grand theory’, but instead to propose 
one of many theoretical ways to understand the problem of ideological exploitation of human 
rights. 
 
2.1.1. Law 
In this subsection of my thesis, I will briefly mention only those definitions that I have 
consciously used for the understanding of the concept of law within this thesis;
57
 the remain-
ing definitions of law should be deemed as either the definitions that I have been yet unaware 
of or as the definitions that I have consciously carved-out from the scope of this work, for 
example, Austin T. Turk’s conflict-coercion model of law58 and the modern intellectual trend 
of Critical Legal Studies.
59
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In this work, when I am speaking of law, I am speaking of rules striving to govern 
human conduct. Sociologist Robert King Merton noted that “[n]o society lacks norms govern-
ing conduct.”60 These norms can also be the norms of morality.61 American Justice Benjamin 
N. Cardozo gave law the following definition: “[A] principle or rule of conduct so established 
as to justify a prediction with reasonable certainty that it will be enforced by the courts if its 
authority is challenged.”62 Anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski defined the concept of law 
as “the specific result of the configuration of obligations, which makes it impossible for the 
native to shirk his responsibility without suffering for it in the future.”63 Sociologist Max We-
ber gave law the following definition: “An order will be called law if it is externally guaran-
teed by the probability that physical or psychological coercion will be applied by a staff of 
people in order to bring about compliance or avenge violation.”64 Sociologist Talcott Parsons 
defined law “as a generalized mechanism of social control that operates diffusely in virtually 
all sectors of the society.”65 
Interestingly, Parsons made two points about law that, in my view, may explain why 
during ideological exploitation of law, the law does not function well. First, Parsons observed 
that law is not the only one element of social control, and, in addition, that law may be disre-
garded if the society at large is unstable: 
[I]t may become evident that the prominence of and the integrity of a le-
gal system as mechanism of social control is partly a function of a certain 
type of social equilibrium. Law flourishes particularly in a society in 
which the most fundamental questions of social values are not currently 
at issue or under agitation. If there is sufficiently acute value conflict, law 
is likely to go by the board.
66
 
Second, Parsons also observed, that law has the function of balancing pluralistic views 
and during a disregard of pluralism of opinions, the law likewise does not function well: 
Finally, it may perhaps be suggested that law has a special importance in 
a pluralistic liberal type of society. It has its strongest place in a society 
where there are many different kinds of interests that must be balanced 
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against each other and that must in some way respect each other. As I 
have already noted, in the totalitarian type of society, which is in a great 
hurry to settle some fundamental general social conflict or policy, law 
tends to go by the board.
67
 
Therefore, a fair understanding of law could be a synergy of the above-quoted defini-
tions. Necessarily, however, the comprehensive definition of law should, in my view, include 
a reference to the possible failure of law, which so often becomes imminent within unstable 
and tense societal situations. To quote an elegant metaphor by Terry Eagleton, “[t]he law, so 
to speak, is stretched so tight across such a multitude of men and women that it dwindles to an 
extreme thinness.”68 
 
2.1.2. Political Manipulation, Ideology, and Power 
Estonian international law specialist Rein Müllerson named the states’ manipulative 
and sometimes hypocritical behavior “geopolitical games.”69 Moreover, even the largest in-
ternational organizations such as the United Nations have been accused of hypocrisy — “fail-
ing to act with the ideals [the organization] espouses.”70 Müllerson suggested that democracy 
and human rights are important, but that there is no need to repeat these words as a mantra, 
the whole purpose of which is the accusation of other states.
71
  
Accusative political manipulation, hypocritical, Orwellian doublespeak is no stranger 
to the present-day politics.
72
 As Stephen Krasner put it: “Organized hypocrisy is the normal 
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state of affairs.”73 For example, we heard the current President of the Russian Federation Vla-
dimir Putin accusing Western mass media of using doublespeak and portraying “white as 
black and black as white” during the Crimean crisis74; while the question was, of course, 
whether Russia itself was using doublespeak in addressing the Crimean referendum of 2014. 
The mass media may name such rhetoric ‘propaganda’,75 although, of course, not all propa-
ganda is inherently negative. Talcott Parsons spoke of propaganda as “one kind of attempt to 
influence attitudes, and hence directly or indirectly the actions of people, by linguistic stimuli, 
by the written or spoken word.”76 The effect is nonetheless the same: the obscurity of the ob-
jective information. Thus, in this work, given the complexity of obtaining objective infor-
mation from the current mass media,
77
 I will refrain from conclusions that may be interpreted 
as accusations. From the outset, I have adopted neither an apologetic nor an accusatory stance.  
Besides, taking sides would be naive, since even democratic regimes can fall prey to 
ideological exploitation of human rights.
78
 David Runciman wrote, “[d]emocratic hypocrisy 
involves a kind of benign self-deception – its stability depends upon people growing comfort-
able with the mask that conceals some of the brute facts about power, and thereby moderating 
the ways that those facts play themselves out.”79 Particularly so, consider the tricky relation-
ship between democracy and human rights, as noted by Scott Sheeran and Sir Nigel Rodley: 
Democracy, in its most basic sense, is not a guarantee of respect for hu-
man rights: there remains the potential tyranny of the majority. … Human 
rights have been successfully manipulated and the subject of realpolitik 
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by political elites and decision-makers.
80
 
In this respect, Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn explained the effects of the democratic 
ideology
81
 on justice: justice is what the majority likes to see.
82
 Precisely, there was potential 
in the human rights system, but there were also flaws due to differences in what people liked 
to see. Tove H. Malloy wrote regarding the “twisting of the meaning of human rights”: 
Unfortunately, the potential energy of this social power [formed by hu-
man rights] has dissipated into a regime of bureaucracy where human 
rights have been emptied as the reservoir of unlimited power. Thus, ra-
ther than fearing the power of human rights, governments have labored to 
twist the meaning of human rights.
83
 
Such ideological exploitation is especially easy for those who have power.
84
 To finish 
this subsection with a quote from Micheline Ishay, “[o]ppression and emancipation are close-
ly intertwined, requiring scholars of human rights to understand how the nature and extent of 
power politics or corporate economic interests, hiding behind the veneer of civilization, shape 
different forms of struggles for human rights.”85  
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2.1.3. Individualism, Freedom, and Sovereignty 
Don Salvador De Madariaga explained the nature of an individual: “Man is a synthesis 
which might be described as individual-in-society; and an individual without a society is no 
more thinkable than a society without individuals.”86 According to Serge I. Hessen, liberal 
democracy is an “unstable tension” between three principles: equality, liberty, and solidari-
ty.
87
 In that regard, we should be reminded of Alexis de Tocqueville who predicted that the 
hypertrophy of the principle of equality, which is cherished with more fervor than the princi-
ple of liberty, would undermine the principle of liberty.
88
 
For the purposes of the present work it is enough to be aware of the subjective and ob-
jective definitions of freedom. The subjective freedom was well explained by Isaiah Berlin in 
one of his essays on the concept of liberty: 
[  free person has a] wish above all to be conscious … as a thinking, 
willing, active being, bearing responsibility for … choices and able to 
explain them by reference to … own ideas and purposes. [The person 
feels] free to the degree that [this person believes] this to be true and en-
slaved to the degree that [this person is] made to realise that it is not 
[true].
89
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The objective freedom may be understood through the Anglo-American tradition of 
freedom “to be left alone”90 and, for example, through the works of John Stuart Mill and his 
famous harm principle: with some limited exceptions, society should allow the person to harm 
oneself as long as the person does not harm others.
91
 Without a doubt, the harm principle does 
not say much about, for example, whether offending
92
 or disgusting
93
 should be also consid-
ered harmful.
94
 
To complement the subjective and objective aspects of freedom, the government, then, 
can and should, to a certain degree, in the words of Rousseau, “force the freedom.”95 Christian 
Starck has referred to Karl von Rotteck who considered the multi-layered nature of freedom: 
the State must “respect and protect the freedom which its subjects enjoy in every sphere of 
activity simply by virtue of being human beings,” even if the State “has itself refrained from 
infringing its subjects’ rights of freedom, it must still protect its subjects against those who 
might threaten them in the course of their interaction.”96 One of the many problems, of 
course, lie in defining the precise borders of government intervention into the realm of per-
sonal autonomy, because the government has a certain autonomy of its own. 
In comparison to freedom and liberty, the concepts of sovereignty and independence 
are similar to freedom and liberty in nature, but distinct insofar as the peculiarities of state-
hood are concerned. According to Stephen Krasner, the term sovereignty has been used, 
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somewhat chaotically,
97
 with at least four different variations: domestic sovereignty, interde-
pendence sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, and, referring to “the exclusion of ex-
ternal actors from domestic authority configurations,” Westphalian sovereignty.98 Just like a 
free person is a sovereign over oneself, the modern state is sovereign constitutionally and as 
an actor in the international arena.
99
 The degree of sovereignty’s absoluteness and divisibility 
has been noted as a controversial issue just like the definition of sovereignty itself: 
But many jurists deny the divisibility of sovereignty, and maintain that a 
State is either sovereign or not. They deny that sovereignty is a character-
istic of every State, and of the membership of the Family of Nations. … 
[T]here exists perhaps no conception, the meaning of which is more con-
troversial than that of sovereignty. It is an indisputable fact that this con-
ception, from the moment when it was introduced into political science 
until the present day, has never had a meaning which was universally 
agreed upon.
100
 
Nevertheless, on a very abstract level, freedom, liberty, sovereignty, and independence 
are similar: they all necessitate unobstructed leeway of action or inaction and autonomy, un-
less, of course, given away in part or in whole. However, it is also freedom, liberty, sover-
eignty, and independence that objectively allow their possessors to harm others. 
 
2.1.4. Human Rights 
Human rights as known from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are not an 
unprecedented challenge to state sovereignty. Stephen D. Krasner noted that before the intro-
duction of universal human rights instruments, states were already compelled by certain inter-
national rules and “natural rights”101 to treat the states’ subjects in a certain way: from reli-
gious toleration to minority rights.
102
 It is helpful to understand the dynamics of human rights 
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within the framework suggested by Karel Vašák and called three generations of human 
rights
103
; the first generation being “blue rights” dealing with liberty and participation in polit-
ical life as promoted by the United States Bill of Rights of 1789
104
 and the French Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789;
105
 the second being “red” economic, social 
and cultural rights relating to equality as promoted by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948;
106
 and the third being “green” rights relating to matters beyond the mere civil 
and social sphere of human life such as environment and economic development. 
Once human rights reached their second generation and were for the first time pro-
claimed universally, the topic of human rights has become apparently riddled with unresolved 
issues: the basis, the content, and the universality of universal human rights are all in ques-
tion.
107
 Conor Gearty has described this paradox concerning human rights as follows: 
[T]he idea of human rights has been reaching dizzying heights in the 
worlds of politics and law whilst its philosophical base has been increas-
ingly called into question, challenged as to its very existence in ways that 
would have been unthinkable in previous epochs.
108
 
“How can human rights be universal if they are not universally recognized?” asked in 
2008 historian Lynn Hunt.
109
 According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, hu-
mans are ascribed human rights because all humans are worthy of respect due to their human 
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dignity.
110
 The human dignity claim is made as though this belief transcends all theories of 
human nature in the same way.
111
 John Lewis referred to Abraham Lincoln saying “in funda-
mental things severe difference may destroy the community. A house divided against itself 
cannot stand.”112 Unfortunately, one can find too many examples of such divides in the house 
of the universal human rights doctrine. 
First, Joseph Raz stated that “respecting human dignity entails treating humans as per-
sons capable of planning and plotting their future. Thus respecting people’s dignity includes 
respecting their autonomy, their right to control their future
113
 … .” Yet the human rights in-
struments were drafted with a top-down approach in mind and, according to UNESCO, “a 
programme of actions to be carried out.”114  
Second, while drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations 
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UNESCO Committee on the Philosophic Principles of the Rights of Man has surveyed the 
leading thinkers of the time, including Mahatma Gandhi, Aldous Huxley, and others, to an-
swer, in essence, a simple question: what is the common ground for human rights?
115
 Yet the 
received answers were so divergent that UNESCO was left to resort to a interpretative decla-
ration that “the members of the United Nations share common convictions on which human 
rights depend” and that the divergent answers also share the same common conviction but 
simply were “stated in terms of different philosophic principles and on the background of 
divergent political and economic systems.”116 Perhaps the most damning was Mahatma Gan-
dhi’s three-paragraph-short comment ending with the following: 
I learned from my illiterate but wise mother that all rights to be deserved 
and preserved came from duty well done. Thus the very right to live ac-
crues to us only when we do the duty of citizenship of the world. From 
this one fundamental statement, perhaps it is easy enough to define the 
duties of Man and Woman and correlate every right to some correspond-
ing duty to be first performed. Every other right can be shown to be a 
usurpation hardly worth fighting for.
117
 
Consider the response of Karel Vašák, who was then the Director of UNESCO’s Divi-
sion of Human Rights and Peace, that philosophical and legal quarrel around the nature of 
human rights is not as important as the message that the Universal Declaration of Human 
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Rights strives to convey: 
Some specialists today consider that the Universal Declaration [of Hu-
man Rights] is binding on Member States; others feel it has become part 
of customary law; still others see it as a kind of “common law” ….  n all 
probability, none of these views is entirely correct. But by recognizing 
the Universal Declaration as a living document and leaving the jurists to 
argue among themselves, one can proclaim one’s faith in the future of 
mankind.
118
 
Although the desired future of mankind, according to the preamble of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, is obviously consisting of such important and emotional
119
 no-
tions as “freedom, justice and peace in the world,” one cannot argue that we should ignore the 
meek philosophical foundation of the document bearing such important slogans and rely only 
on “social consciousness”120 that humans would not exploit human rights to their self-interest. 
To quote Ludwig Wittgenstein, “[a]t the core of all well-founded belief, lies belief that is un-
founded.”121 The universality of human rights and its pretense to having a natural law charac-
ter are only some examples of such unfounded beliefs.  
Regarding the universality of human rights and their supposedly natural law character, 
there could be made many examples, where the claim of universality would be put convinc-
ingly into question. For instance, in 1990, the Organization of the Islamic Conference prom-
ulgated the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, the article 22 of which stated that 
“[e]veryone shall have the right to express his opinion freely” but also added that only “in 
such manner as would not be contrary to the principles of the Shari’ah.”122 The referred article 
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should be understood, for example, in conjunction with the crime of blasphemy in Islam; an 
impious utterance or action concerning anything sacred in Islam may even be punished by 
death.
123
 As Jason Kuznicki blisteringly noted: “[R]eaders should realize that not everything 
appearing under the name “human rights” has been accurately labeled.”124 
Do human rights as envisaged by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights form a 
part of natural law? Hardly so. Consider the following passage by an Italian philosopher, 
“icon of liberal anti-fascism”, Benedetto Croce:  
[The UNESCO report and questionnaire itself] says that [human rights] 
vary historically; thereby abandoning the logical basis of those rights re-
garded as universal rights of man, and reducing them to, at most, the 
rights of man in history. … Thus, they are not eternal claims but simply 
historical facts, manifestations of the needs of such and such an age and 
an attempt to satisfy those needs.
125
 
However, human rights are indeed rooted in political and legal theory. Today’s human 
rights policymaking and legislation resembles William Talbott’s modern utilitarian theory of 
human rights according to which human rights are justified by the good consequences univer-
sal rights yield; the system being thus “self-improving and self-regulating.”126 Dr Guglielmo 
Verdirame noted also the foundationalist argument that is used to ground human rights in 
basic human needs and thus grounding human rights in a scientifically based theory of human 
rights.
127
 Naturally, there were also theistic attempts to explain human rights.
128
 However, I 
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agree with Verdirame’s remark: 
The … problem with theistic justifications is that they only succeed inso-
far as we share [the common] belief, whereas it is clearly the case that we 
do not. Even if we look at the history of humanity as a whole, we obvi-
ously never really did. Outside religion, there is no comprehensive theory 
that tells us what we must believe.
129
 
This is also the problem with the concept of universal human rights: it tells us what we 
must believe. However, the theistic approach would have had at least a theological belief as 
the basis for the approach. The concept of universal human rights has no common basis, and 
this allows the meaning of universal human rights to be so easily twisted according to differ-
ent ideologies. 
 
2.2. Interdisciplinary Links 
2.2.1. Leon Festinger’s Theory of Cognitive Dissonances 
In this work I draw upon Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance, which ex-
plained from the psychological perspective how humans strive for internal mental consistency 
and for eradication of contradictions,
130
 whether they do it to protect public self-image
131
 or 
for other reasons. Truly, it may seem that contradictions are a part of human life, yet contra-
dictions cause noticeable mental discomfort to those who try to hold at the same time two or 
more contradictory beliefs or who acquire new conflicting information about existing be-
liefs.
132
 Elliot Aronson explained the role of dissonance theory in the field of social psycholo-
gy as being a theory about “sense-making”: 
Dissonance theory is more than simply a theory about consistency. It is 
essentially a theory about sense-making: how people try to make sense 
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out of their beliefs, their environment, and their behavior — and thus try 
to lead lives that are (at least in their own minds) reasonable, sensible, 
and meaningful.
133
 
The concept of cognitive dissonances is thus helpful to understand international law in 
postmodern society, because international law is used today as one of the means to resolve 
conflicts, but international law itself may also be the source of dissonances.
134
 In this respect, 
sociologist  . Javier Treviño’s description is appropriate: “In postmodern society the law is 
seen either as reflexive system driven by paradoxes or as a set of discourses, or ‘stories,’ rife 
with contradictions.”135 
 
2.2.2. Robert King Merton’s Strain Theory 
In addition, this work has been influenced by Robert King Merton’s strain theory, the 
simple yet profound addition to sociology. Adhering to a strain theory means having, essen-
tially, a structural-functionalist
136
 viewpoint that it is the social structures within society that 
may pressure citizens to commit crimes, or, more broadly put, deviations from socially ac-
cepted norms.
137
 Robert King Merton has drawn upon Émile Durkheim’s ideas of structure 
and anomie,
138
 but was the first in 1957 to frame the ideas into a theory of its own.
139
 The 
main ideas remained the same: the existence of strain toward deviant behavior due to the 
structure of the society, and different reaction to these strains, sometimes deviant and unac-
ceptable, yet understandable in practice. 
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Robert King Merton’s strain theory is still relevant even in the context of this work, 
perhaps, due to his deep understanding of sociological theories that are “consonant with a 
variety of systems of sociological thought.”140 Social structures are, according to Merton, the 
“organized set of social relationships in which members of the society or group are variously 
implicated.”141 Anomie, according to Durkheim, was a state of normlessness, and, according 
to Merton, it arises when there is “an acute disjunction between the cultural norms and goals 
and the socially structured capacities of members of the group to act in accord with them”142. 
Since social norms are broad enough to include moral norms, the phenomenon of normless-
ness can be understood as the lack of morals, or in the words of Spanish philosopher Jos  Or-
tega y Gasset, amoralidad — the state in which the formless mass of average people 
thrives.
143
 Merton notes, that paradoxically, “cultural values may help to produce behavior 
which is at odds with the mandates of the values themselves”,144 producing thus a sort of an 
iatrogenic (Greek: “brought forth by the healer”) unintended result. 
Thereby, Merton distinguished five modes of adaptation to such disjunction between 
set cultural or social goals and available institutionalized means, or, in other words, strain: 
conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion.
145
 These modes of adaptation de-
pend on two factors: attitude toward goals, and attitude toward institutionalized, or, in other 
words, culturally acceptable means. Using a simple example from criminology, we can imag-
ine two teenagers, similar in goals but differing in wealth. The wealthy child may, for exam-
ple, afford to buy a new piece of technology. The other child, however, whilst likewise wish-
ing to obtain that piece of technology, will not have the institutionalized means, in this case, 
money, to obtain it, and may resort to crime. Whilst the first child would be a conformist
146
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using institutionalized means for attainment of culturally acceptable goals, the other child will 
be labeled a juvenile delinquent that, despite having an innovative
147
 way to overcome the 
lack of wealth, has nevertheless behaved in a socially unacceptable way. At least we can im-
agine the society in our example to remain content, that the second child did not turn to rebel-
lion as a mode of adaptation, because rebellion would entail both the rejection of institutional-
ized means and of culturally acceptable norms, and may end in violent or non-violent propa-
gation of new goals and means.
148
 
For the purposes of the present work, it is not as important to understand the concepts 
of ritualism, or abandonment of cultural goals and retention of institutional means,
149
 and 
retreatism, or abandonment of both cultural goals and institutionalized means.
150
 These types 
of modes of adaptation to structural strain are not necessarily deviant or harmful.  
However, in my view, — and here the social-scientific proximity of law and sociology 
can be used to our advantage — the strain theory may be well applicable in the context of 
international law in understanding the behavior of different actors: states, persons, organiza-
tions. For instance, we can likewise imagine a state that does not have the institutionalized 
opportunity to annex a certain desired territory, because the particular law at the moment does 
not permit it, even though that foreign territory may be culturally very desirable to that said 
state. There are certain difficulties with the applicability of a strain theory to international 
relations, because, for example, we cannot easily juxtapose the concepts of society and of an 
international arena, yet with certain assumptions it may be possible, if, for example, we con-
sider only the member states of the United Nations to be the members of such society. Thus, 
we can imagine the international arena viewing negatively the state that wished to annex the 
said foreign territory in our example above. Thus, we can understand the state resorting to 
rebellion if it disregards the views of the United Nations’ majority and finds other means to 
gain control over the desired foreign territory. To reiterate, the strain theory, in itself, is, in my 
view, nothing revolutionary, yet this theory, in conjunction with legal realism and differentia-
tion between law in the books and law in action, helps to understand certain behaviors ade-
quately and with more empathy toward the acting state, person, or organization. 
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2.3. Legal Paradigm for Understanding Ideological Exploitation of Human Rights 
As a preliminary remark, I wish to reiterate the methodological importance of the cho-
sen legal paradigm. Robert King Merton has well described the reasons for choosing and ad-
hering to specific paradigms. According to Merton, paradigms have at least five related func-
tions:
151
 
1. First, paradigms “provide a compact arrangement of the central concepts and their 
interrelations that are utilized for description and analysis.” 
2. Second, paradigms “lessen the likelihood of inadvertently introducing hidden as-
sumptions and concepts, for each new assumption and each new concept must be 
either logically derived from previous components of the paradigm or explicitly 
introduced into it.” 
3. Third, “paradigms advance the cumulation of theoretical interpretation,” being 
“the foundation upon which the house of interpretations is built.” 
4. Fourth, paradigms “promote analysis rather than the description of concrete de-
tails” and “can sensitize the analyst to empirical and theoretical problems which 
he might otherwise overlook.” 
5. Fifth, paradigms legitimize the use of qualitative analysis, because qualitative 
analysis “often resides in a private world of penetrating but unfathomable insights 
and ineffable understandings.” 
Thus, the following three subsections explain the author’s legal paradigm for under-
standing ideological exploitation of human rights. 
 
2.3.1. Legal Realism 
An instinct that we all seem to possess is to ‘majestify the law’,152 to believe that law 
is sacred, mighty, and universally just. But that instinct is not always rightly oriented. As a 
consequence, we may observe that the ideas of law are often incongruent with the realities of 
life.  
Former American Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes has famously proposed that the law 
does not live in mystery or in the realm of deductive logic, the law lives in practical experi-
ence: 
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When we study law we are not studying a mystery but a well-known pro-
fession. …  f you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look 
at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which 
such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his 
reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer 
sanctions of conscience.
153
 
Indeed, the legal realist school of thought is most often linked to American legal real-
ism of 1920s, fueled by cynicism, skepticism, and pragmatic jurisprudence of that time. 
Pragmatism, according to the father of pragmatic thought William James, is an “attitude of 
orientation” that requires to look away “from first things, principles, ‘categories,’ supposed 
necessities” and to look “toward last things, fruits, consequences, facts.”154 At the time of its 
flourishing, pragmatic legal realism was a natural reaction to the optimism and formalism in 
the society; after all, the naive optimism lead to the Great Depression and to two World Wars. 
Perhaps, thus, given the unstable geopolitical events of the early 2000s, there is still room for 
a dose of such skepticism also in the present days, almost a hundred years after the works of 
the first American legal realists. 
Karl N. Llewellyn has put forth 9 basic tenets of legal realism, which I, too, adopted 
before writing the present work:
155
 
1. The law is in the ever-changing flux, fueled by judicial interpretation, and for 
common law countries, creation of law. 
2. The law is a means to social ends, and not an end in itself. 
3. The society is also in a constant state of flux, which is “typically faster than the 
law.” 
4. The Is and Ought must be “temporarily divorced,” for the introduction of Ought 
obscures the investigation of the facts. 
5. The traditional legal rules and concepts insofar as they have the pretense to de-
scribing what the courts are doing should be distrusted. 
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6. The formalistic theory of over-reliance on the above-mentioned legal rules should 
be also distrusted. 
7. Cases and legal situations should be grouped into narrower unique categories. 
8. Law should be evaluated in terms of its effects. 
9. The above-mentioned tenets should be applied for a “sustainable and programmat-
ic attack on the problems of law.” 
Moreover, according to sociologist  . Javier Treviño, legal realism of the early 20th 
century was also for the intellectual community “a reaction against abstractions and universal 
principles and a movement toward the idea of a changing and developing society.”156 As law-
yers, we know that in practice, not always do law and legal rules predict the outcome of the 
client’s case. Prominent American pragmatic instrumentalist John Dewey famously advanced 
a “logic relative to consequences rather than to antecedents, a logic of prediction of probabili-
ties rather than one of deduction of certainties.”157 In other words, it is, in fact, more useful to 
look at the possible practical consequences of the particular legal framework, than to stay in 
the abstract realm of legal rules.
158
  
Realist approach, thus, means staying grounded in reality, noticing the undesirable as 
well as the desirable behavior without apologism or idealism. Sociologist Robert King Merton 
noted that generally, “[t]he technically most effective procedure, whether culturally legitimate 
or not, becomes typically preferred to institutionally prescribed conduct.”159 This is the same 
logic behind persons wishing to optimize their tax behavior, sometimes crossing the legally 
acceptable line toward the evasion of taxes, because they believe they can do so. Merton, us-
ing an example from competitive athletics, calls this behavior to be construed as “winning the 
game” instead of “winning under the rules of the game.”160 
The same is true, of course, for international relations. After all, international interac-
tion between the states and other actors at the international arena happens within the confines 
of the same social reality.
161
 Moreover, commentary on the behavior of states tends to over-
look that states, too, are concerned more with own gains rather than the meek safety-net of 
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international law.
162
 
Jason Goldsmith described realists, in comparison to optimistic institutionalists, in the 
following way: 
[Realists] think that a nation’s primary interest is security, and they view 
international behaviors largely as a function of national power. … [Real-
ists] believe most international institutions reflect distributions of nation-
al power, and that the little cooperation we see is fragile. Institutionalists, 
by contrast, … acknowledge that nations have partially conflicting inter-
ests, and they model international life as a multilateral prisoner’s dilem-
ma or some version of a coordination problem.
163
 
Just as not all natural law should be rejected as irrelevant and metaphysical,
164
 in the 
realist context, the behavior of the states should not be viewed pessimistically only as nega-
tive or violent and aggressive. It is well possible, as it is often the case, that the state plays a 
crucial, vital role in safeguarding the well-being of its subjects. To finish this discussion of 
legal realism with a quote by Karel Vašák: “[Human rights] remain dead letters as long as the 
political power which emanates from society fails to insert them in the social order.”165 
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2.3.2. Hierarchical Interplay between Human Rights and Other Rights 
In this subsection, a brief comparison will be made between concepts of human rights 
and other rights. In 2001, Estonian constitutional law specialist Madis Ernits translated a short 
article by Martin Borowski, then assistant to Robert Alexy at the Kiel Christian Albrecht Uni-
versity.
166
 Martin Borowski in his article distinguished essentially four categories of funda-
mental rights: human rights, international constitutive rights, supranational human rights, na-
tional human rights.
167
 In the present work, I relied on the same understanding of the follow-
ing four categories of rights. 
First, Borowski considered human rights to be abstract, universal “moral rights”, 
which due to their fundamental nature are at the heart of theories of justice.
168
  
Second, Borowski also distinguished as a category, that is separate from human rights, 
international and supranational fundamental rights.
169
 According to him, international funda-
mental rights are the rights which derive from international treaties and conventions, such as, 
for example, the 19 December 1948’s United Nations Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,
170
 but also 19 December 1966’s International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,
171
 19 December 1966’s International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights,
172
 and, with particular interest for the European continent, 4 November 1950’s Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
173
 and 18 October 
1961’s European Social Charter.174  
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Third, Borowski named the economic freedoms and fundamental rights in the Europe-
an Union to be in the category of supranational constitutive rights. In the present moment we 
may find in this category the four freedoms of the European Union’s internal market: the free 
movement of goods, capital, services, and people; but also, due to the Maastricht Treaty 
signed on 7 February 1992,
175
 the European Union citizenship rights, and, due to the Treaty of 
Lisbon signed on 13 December 2007,
176
 the fundamental rights according to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
177
 
Fourth, Borowski recognized as a distinct category domestic constitutional rights.
178
 
Domestic human rights are, according to Borowski, an attempt to “transform” human rights 
into national positive law, in a way that makes these rights to have “a higher grade” in com-
parison to international and other rights, because national rights are justiciable and enforcea-
ble through the national court system.
179
  
 
2.3.3. Human Rights as Principles: Analogy to Constitutional Rights 
Finally, I am of the opinion that, at most, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
proclaimed a set of principles. Sociologist Jean Haesaert suggested that framing the declara-
tion in general, but not too general, manner in terms of standards, instead of rules, would en-
sure that proclaimed framework will prevail through generations.
180
 To draw an analogy, of 
similar principle-like nature are many constitutional norms.
181
 
In Estonia, just like in many other states, the main fundamental legal act is the Consti-
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tution.
182
 Estonian constitutional law specialist Madis Ernits has recently suggested that the 
majority of constitutional rights are to be interpreted as principles, and not as rules.
183
 In mak-
ing that statement Ernits, in particular, has drawn on the theory of the legal philosopher Rob-
ert Alexy,
184
 influential in Estonia for providing an important commentary to the post-Soviet 
Constitution of the Republic of Estonia.
185
 Robert Alexy has found that principles are not as 
rigid and inflexible in application as rules: rules in conflict with each other necessitate over-
haul of the conflicting regulation, and, in contrast, principles in conflict with each other may 
very well be reconciled through a balancing interpretation of these principles.
186
  
In particular, Robert Alexy postulated the Law of Competing Principles: “The circum-
stances under which one principle takes precedence over another constitute the conditions of a 
rule which has the same legal consequences as the principle taking precedence.”187 Another 
law was then born, the Law of Balancing: “The greater the degree of non-satisfaction or limi-
tation of one principle, the greater must be the importance of satisfying the other.”188 Moreo-
ver, Alexy, by citing long-standing case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court, put 
forward what he called a ‘radiation’ thesis: constitutional rights norms have a ‘radiating ef-
fect’ “on the entire legal system by appealing to the concept of an objective order of val-
ues.”189 However, Alexy noted the following disadvantages of principle-like norms: 
The adoption of principles at the highest level of abstraction has ad-
vantages and disadvantages. The advantages lie in their flexibility. They 
can be used as the starting-points of doctrinal justification for a great va-
riety of structural and substantive constitutional requirements in all areas 
of law. The disadvantage lies in their vagueness. They invite one of the 
most obscure forms of legal justification, the ‘deduction’ or ‘derivation’ 
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of concrete content from abstract principles.
190
 
In that sense and on that abstract level, constitutional rights may be compared to hu-
man rights.
191
 The crux of differentiation between rules and principles seems to be the content 
and effect of the particular norm, and not, for example, merely the title of the norm. Indeed, 
some principles may have a rule-like nature. Ernits makes an example of the “principle” of 
proportionality, which, in reality, is a specific three-step test, which can be either “met or not 
met.”192 At least in the context of Estonian law, the principle of proportionality has acquired a 
nature of a rule that courts apply in cases of determining the proportionality of certain 
measures.  
In contrast, some rule-like clauses may, in practice, be on the level of principles. For 
example, the sovereignty clause in the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia has also been 
named to be a principle,
193
 albeit a very important one; nevertheless even a portion of state’s 
sovereignty may be limited, for example, by an international treaty. Thus, in a European Sta-
bility Mechanism case before Riigikohus (the Estonian Supreme Court) in 2012, the Supreme 
Court has set out to test the limits of the sovereignty clause in the Constitution of the Republic 
of Estonia, and decided that by acceding to the European Union and through the respective 
accession legal acts, Estonia has given away a part of its sovereignty.
194
 The Supreme Court 
noted that such erosion of sovereignty is not uncommon, as, for example, there are over 1000 
international treaties between Estonia and its counter-parties.
195
 To take another example, 
from international law, in 1975 the European Court of Human Rights has not reached an abso-
lute unanimity in deciding whether there is a right of access to courts under paragraph 1 of 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
196
 
Thus, if constitutional norms are mostly principles, and if human rights are like consti-
tutional norms, then human rights should also be deemed, at most, to be principles. It should 
be unsurprising, then, that the meaning of universal human rights can be so easily twisted. 
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3. EXAMPLES: FOUR VARIANTS OF FUNDAMENTAL DISSONANCES 
3.1. Intra-personal Level: Freedom against Freedom of Others; Example from Norway 
Attacks (2011) 
Consider a quote by Jill Marshal: 
… [F]or some people choices are made that others find unpalatable. The 
role of law is crucial in preventing or permitting or even encouraging cer-
tain ways of being, living and existing.
197
 
Is the conception of law as being the guardian of the society, in practice, adequate? In 
a liberal society, the freedom and personal autonomy means also the freedom to commit un-
desirable acts that often have tragic consequences. In this section, I will explore on the intra-
personal level of fundamental dissonances the example of Norway Attacks of 2011 by a radi-
cal nationalist Anders Behring Breivik and will conclude that it is possible to ideologically 
twist the meaning of human rights and human freedoms to the tragic detriment of human 
rights and human freedoms of others. 
On 21 July 2011, Anders Behring Breivik distributed the ultra-nationalist compendi-
um called “2083: A European Declaration of Independence”198 to around 1000 of recipients. 
Breivik later admitted that the 1515-pages long work consisted for about 60% of cut-and-
paste thoughts of other people,
199
 yet the compendium also contained many of Breivik’s own 
thoughts and even personal curriculum vitae with interview-style questions and answers. The 
main idea behind Breivik’s compendium was to warn and to call to action the fellow Europe-
an “brothers and sisters” against the dangers of the “Islamification of Europe” and of the lib-
eral politics promoting multiculturalism.
200
 Breivik’s solution was violently ruthless, and plot-
ted for the duration of five years with strenuous attention to detail; under cover of running a 
fake farm, which he created for the sole purpose of receiving the subsidies available for farm-
ers and fertilizers used in production of a lethal bomb, with which Breivik tried to kill the 
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prime minister of Norway, and thus instill fear into the politicians of Norway supporting mul-
ticulturalism.
201
 
However, The Guardian reasonably calls “the worst manifestation of Breivik’s scrupu-
lous attention to detail” Breivik’s subsequent act after setting up the bomb in Oslo: illegally 
wearing a police uniform and posing as a policeman sent to reassure the teenagers at the 
Utoya Island’s Labor Party’s youth camp, meticulously hunting down and shooting the most 
attendees of the camp that he could find.
202
 “The objective was not to kill 69 people at Utoya. 
The objective was to kill all of them. … The main goal was to use the water as a mass-
destruction method. Basically, I assumed most people would drown [due to] death anxiety,” 
Breivik explained during the court trial.
203
 He deemed shooting the youth to be a barbaric 
method of attaining his goals, which was, according to him, was nevertheless necessary since 
European Union and Norwegian regulations made it difficult to acquire the required undiluted 
fertilizer for bomb making and since these youth were due to their political devotion to multi-
culturalism his “legitimate targets.”204 Thus, through this ruthless behavior he tried to prove 
and publicize his extreme ideology and allegiance to other anti-Islamists of Europe that he 
called the “Knights Templar,” alluding to the Europe’s crusader conquests of the middle ages. 
In fact, during the Utoya massacre he called the Norwegian police, which according to the 
critique of journalist Ǻsne Seierstad was poorly prepared for such massacre to happen,205 to 
offer his surrender and introduced himself to the telephone operator as “Commander of the 
Knights Templar Europe – … organised in the anti-communistic and Norwegian resistance 
movement against the Islamisation of Europe and Norway.”206 
Anders Behring Breivik was accused of “setting off a bomb in central Oslo that killed 
eight people, then fatally shooting 69 people at a youth camp run by the ruling Labor Party on 
nearby Utoya Island.”207 He received the Norway’s maximum punishment: 21 years in pris-
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on.
208
 During the court trial, the accused was acting calm and confident, saying that he does 
not recognize the Norwegian Court system for it is supported by the political party that sup-
ports European liberalism, Muslim immigration, and multiculturalism.
209
 Though it seems 
very much misplaced to attack and hurt young people of Norway in order to “save Norway,” 
Breivik, according to his manifesto, and according to his lawyer believed himself to be acting 
as a free savior of free Europe.
210
 Notably, Breivik was found by the majority of psychiatric 
experts to have been sane at the moment of the killings.
211
 Nevertheless, though saddened by 
the grief of the incident, Norway relied on its judiciary to find a punishment for the killer. 
CNN described Norway as respecting human rights of the killer even despite the killer’s vio-
lence and reluctance to accept or recognize the Norwegian court system.
212
  
 n 1947, French professor of philosophy Ren  Gabriel Eugene Maheu argued: “I can-
not, without danger of self-contradiction, use my liberty to appeal to the liberty of others 
without treating their liberty as liberty, i.e. without respecting it.”213 This reasoning could not 
have been more powerful. In the case of Norwegian attacks of 2011, when Breivik expressed 
radical views, he had a justified right to do so, but in resorting to violence as an argument or 
as a vehicle for publicity, he has self-contradicted his own views by disregarding the liberty of 
others with no justification for such disregard, even despite his radical contempt for certain 
cultures and nationalities. In other words, it has been proved possible to ideologically and 
radically exploit the meaning of human rights and human freedoms and in the process to 
cause ruthless rampage to others’ property and lives. 
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3.2. Intra-state Level: Government against People; Example from Lustration during 
Ukrainian Crisis (2013 — Ongoing) 
On 21 November 2013, Ukraine suspended preparations for the implementation of an 
association agreement with the European Union.
214
 The same day, mass protests ensued in the 
Ukrainian capital city of Kyiv. The unrest in the country was not only internal, but also 
seemed to affect the geopolitical situation in the whole region.  
Since international law can rarely affect intra-state affairs, this section will be short. In 
this section, I will examine on the intra-state level of fundamental dissonances the example of 
lustration law adopted during the Ukrainian crisis. I will conclude that lustration is an exam-
ple of exploitation of the meaning of human rights and human freedoms in the unstable situa-
tion of the changed ideology.  
Indeed, one of the examples of violation of human rights by the pretense of protecting 
the rights of others was the lustration
215
 law in Ukraine in 2014, according to which many 
government workers, unless they resigned themselves, would be dismissed because of their 
work for the previous government.
216
 Moreover, the law also stipulated a prohibition into the 
future, prohibiting “from working in public administration for ten years and others for five 
years” officials, who worked in Yanukovich-era positions “for a total of at least one year in 
the period between February 25, 2010, and February 22, 2014.”217  
The lustration law was received with severe criticism. For example, the Venice Com-
mission, the consultative body on constitutional law issues in the Council of Europe has criti-
cized the Ukrainian lustration law for harsh and unjustified lustration criteria, for violating 
human rights of the people in question, and for disregarding the judiciary’s role in safeguard-
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ing the human rights in violation.
218
 In November 2014, the Supreme Court of Ukraine filed a 
constitutional petition for verification of the lustration law and found the lustration law to be 
unconstitutional.
219
 In particular, there is a serious problem of judiciary lustration undermin-
ing the principles of individual responsibility of the judges and judicial independence.
220
 
The above-mentioned critique shows that, although being justified as safeguards of the 
new political order, harsh lustration policies, which do not stipulate fair lustration criteria, 
affect human rights to the detriment of people, who have been expended only due to the 
change in ideology, be it democracy or any other governing regime. It is thus possible to ex-
ploit the meaning and belittle the influence of human rights also at the intra-state level, if the 
defense of the governing ideology justifies such exploitation. 
 
3.3. Inter-state Level: Political Manipulation against Objectivity 
3.3.1. Introduction to Crimean Crisis (2014 — Ongoing) 
Since ideological exploitation of human rights happens very often at the inter-state 
level, Section 3.3 of this thesis has been given proportionally more attention and has been 
divided into three subsections. In this first short subsection I will briefly introduce the Crime-
an Crisis (2014 — ongoing). In the next, longer subsection, I will present my analysis of the 
key speeches made by the current President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin in rela-
tion to the Crimean Crisis. I the subsection after that, I will conclude that it is possible to ideo-
logically exploit the concept of human rights at the inter-state level when states use political 
manipulation, accusations, and power. 
By ‘Crimean Crisis’ I mean the specific political situation in Ukraine (2014 — ongo-
ing); named by many Western states to be an illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula by 
the Russian Federation; and named by the Russian Federation to be the execution of the Cri-
mean people’s right to self-determination. It is an ongoing crisis, in my view, because 
Ukraine’s continuous ambition is to regain the control of the Crimean peninsula, which is 
currently under political and military control of the Russian Federation. In general, the situa-
tion is emotionally laden and tense.
221
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Eventually, as Crimean referendum of March 2014 effected de facto accession of the 
Crimean peninsula into the Russian Federation, the unrest was felt in the whole world as the 
West, once again, opposed itself against the East. The interpretation of the legality or illegali-
ty of the situation as far as the international law was concerned, it seemed, depended on the 
side one sympathized with. If one turned to media of or to political statements of the states 
involved, one would feel an immense dissonance because of the contradictory messages and 
accusations. Questions such as whether the Crimean situation was an illegal annexation or a 
legal accession, whether the actions of the Russian Federation constituted a non-violent inter-
ventionist aggression against the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state or whether the actions of 
the Russian Federation constituted aid to the people’s right to self-determination,222 were not 
easy to answer. Answers to these and many other related dilemmas depended on the objective 
interpretation of the facts surrounding the ongoing Ukrainian crisis and, not less importantly, 
on the ability to access a truthful factual framework of reference. 
In the next subsection, I will analyze three key speeches by President Putin made in 
address of the Crimean Crisis. I will find that Russia was aware of twisting the norms of in-
ternational law but due to historical pressures had no other choice but to show its power on 
the Crimean Peninsula. 
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3.3.2. Analysis of President Putin’s Crimean Speeches of 2014 
In this subsection, I will focus on three key speeches delivered by the President of 
Russian Federation Vladimir Putin in 2014 in relation to the Crimean Crisis.
223
 As a result of 
my analysis, from the perspective of the Crimean Crisis and international law, in these three 
speeches I found the following common messages and threads of rhetoric. 
Block of ethnic and nationalistic messages:
224
 
1. Russia is strong; 
2. Russia’s task is to protect the Slavic nation; 
3. Slavs are spiritually one; 
4. Crimean referendum was legitimate. 
Block of international relations messages: 
5. Russia is consistent with own previous statements; 
6. Western colleagues are not; 
7. West is under an illusion of power; 
8. All international actors must be respected; 
9. West can exploit and defy international law, and Russia can, too. 
There are many tangents one can take in exploring President Putin’s arguments. Due 
to space limitations, I will only offer moderate critique of Professor Lauri Mälksoo’s civiliza-
tional argument and will conclude the following: in the analyzed speeches, President Putin’s 
justification for intervention in Crimea was legally flawed in theory but inevitable in practice 
due to the governing ideology in Russia.  
Professor Lauri Mälksoo hypothesized that when we hear President Putin speaking of 
‘international law’, we hear Russia’s own peculiar interpretation of ‘international law’, histor-
ically and culturally different from that of the West.
225
 However, there are some drawbacks in 
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using professor Mälksoo’s hypothesis as a starting point for argumentation. Not only ‘differ-
ing interpretation’ hypothesis opens the Pandora’s box of debate on universality of interna-
tional law, the rhetoric behind the ‘differing interpretation’ hypothesis, in my view, would 
likely purport the stereotype of Russia as being intrinsically different,
226
 and since difference 
is often taken as a sign of danger,
227
 Russia would continue to be viewed not as a strong par-
ticipant in the international arena but as a monstrosity that the West must constantly fend 
against. Christopher Scott Browning’s geopolitical observation that in the ‘othering’ discourse 
“Russia remains construed as the object to be acted upon, the diseased that needs to be cured”, 
whilst the Western identity continues to thrive “as charitable and benevolent”,228 suggests that 
Russia continues to be demonized and antagonized. I would even suggest that, especially after 
the fall of USSR, Russia has been outright humiliated in the international arena.
229
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avoid oppressive ‘othering’, I would suggest, rather, that Russia viewed international law the 
same way the West did,
230
 but, to be precise, Russia wished to exploit international law, just 
as the West does, in order to follow and promote Russia’s own ideological agenda,231 which is 
indeed culturally and historically specific. 
Did the actions of Russian Federation in Crimea go in consistency with and form a 
part of customary international law? President Putin’s answer to this question, at first glance, 
needed no explanation; as the head of the Russian state he was expected to justify Russia’s 
actions. However, was President Putin not indirectly admitting the violation of international 
law, after so many references to the international law’s feebleness, accusations of violations 
by the West, and a subtle message: why cannot Russia, too, tag along with the systematic de-
fiance of international law? “[Н]  мы э о  ачали,” President Putin proclaimed calmly.232  
Thus, we can conclude that during the Crimean Crisis, the Russian Federation has ex-
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ploited the norms of international law and human rights law. In the following subsection, I 
will elaborate that such exploitation is not uncommon at the inter-state level and will suggest 
that is precisely due to ideological needs and societal strains that such exploitation at the inter-
state level occurs.  
 
3.3.3. Subconclusion to Crimean Crisis Example of Political Manipulation  
against Objectivity 
In this subsection, I will conclude that during the Crimean Crisis the Russian Federa-
tion had no other choice but to show its power on the Crimean peninsula and that states often 
exploit in international relations the norms of international law and human rights law to the 
benefit of their ideology. This resembles the classical legal realist theory of law in the books 
versus law in practice.
233
 To pick an example from far 2003, Amnesty International noted on 
the state of human rights in Russia, that “[t]he law has extended its reach in the Russian Fed-
eration, but flaws in the way it is applied mean that it still offers little protection to many peo-
ple.”234 Frankly, Russian Federation, being the successor of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, is not new to such dissonances.
235
 What if law on paper versus law in practice is in-
deed the main systemic malaise that is continuously parasitic on the legal organism of Russia? 
Even more so, to be fair, some defiance of international law is common to other states 
as well. Consider certain Western actions, which seemed like hypocrisies to President 
Putin.
236
 For instance, one case of avoiding international law is Guantanamo Bay,
237
 which 
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was not expressly mentioned by President Putin in the analyzed speeches but which neverthe-
less remains to be one of the most prominent areas with alleged extra-legal violations of hu-
man rights. There are, of course, many other instances of human rights violations in the West; 
to pick another example from the fertile fields of counterinsurgency law: Israeli targeted kill-
ings.
238
 Thus, in reality, we can point our finger to any place on the world map, and in the 
lands nearby we would find the effect of the same generalities: the meekness of international 
law, and the need to reiterate international law’s universality. 
Could it be, that in certain cases prima facie defiance of international law is allowed 
by virtue of custom?
239
 However, here, too, I would distinguish between what the law is, in 
principle, and what the actual practice may have been. While Article 92 of the United Nations 
Charter and Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, for example, 
do allow international custom to be the source of international law, it is questionable whether 
customary disobedience of law could reasonably be considered a source of international law 
in the first place. Such dissonance between obligations and practice is probably why Michael 
Byers suggested to differentiate “between ‘opinio juris’ and ‘state practice’ with the distinc-
tion between international law and international politics, between what states might legally be 
obligated to do, and what they actually did as the result of far wider range of pressures and 
opportunities.”240 President Putin has made it clear that there were no other options for Russia 
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than to aid Crimea.
241
 If certain interpretation of international law results in Russia’s actions 
to be named a violation of international law, this does not affect the reality, that the majority 
of Crimean population viewed Russia’s actions as aid and viewed prohibitions of international 
law for such interventionist aid as formality.
242
 On this point, I agree with professor Jean 
d’Aspremont, that until “certified by a law-applying authority,” “customary international rules 
often lack normative character and, hence, their authority is gravely enfeebled.”243 
Thus, to finish with an example of Crimean Crisis, even if Russia’s appeal to the Ko-
sovo analogy was irrelevant
244
 and even if there was no justification under international law to 
be used in principle,
245
 Russia’s intervention was nevertheless inevitable in practice; and con-
tinuing scrutiny of international law arguments and counter-arguments would not resolve this 
deadlock. The analysis of the Crimean Crisis situation allows us to conclude that on the inter-
state level states often exploit international law and human rights law to the benefit of their 
culturally and historically specific state ideology. 
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3.4. Inter-personal Level: Expression Becoming Offensive 
3.4.1. Description and Analysis of Events Surrounding Cancellation of  
Southampton Conference of 2015 
Since ideological exploitation of human rights happens also very often at the inter-
personal level, Section 3.4 of this thesis has been given proportionally more attention and has 
been divided into two subsections. In this first subsection I will analyze the events surround-
ing the lobbied cancellation in March 2015 of the Southampton academic conference on Isra-
el’s right to exist. In the next subsection, I will elaborate on the conclusion, using the example 
of freedom of expression being limited due to offensiveness, that human rights could be ideo-
logically exploited also at the inter-personal level. 
In March 2015, in Southampton, United Kingdom, the Southampton University was 
pressured to cancel a planned academic conference titled “International Law and the State of 
Israel: Legitimacy, Responsibility and Exceptionalism”246 which questioned, quite critically, 
whether the state of Israel has under the international law a right to exist.
247
 The organizers’ 
position was critical in the sense that it criticized Israel of, for example, “apartheid, of which 
the Gaza violence is a symptom.”248 Given the nature of such critical position and given that 
such position has the potential to seriously offend, the University claimed that it did “not have 
enough resources to mitigate the risks”249 and thus justified the cancellation of the conference. 
The University of Southampton confirmed that it is legally obliged “to ensure that freedom of 
speech within the law is secured for members, students and employees of the University, as 
well as for visiting speakers” for the speakers to be able “to have freedom within the law to 
question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopu-
lar opinions, with due regard for the need to respect others and promote the best interests of 
the University and academic learning, without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their 
jobs or privileges.”250 On 2 April 2015, the representative organization for the universities of 
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the United Kingdom “Universities UK” released a press release in support of the University 
of Southampton’s decision to cancel the academic conference, but recognized it aptly that the 
situations such as at the University of Southampton “illustrate how extraordinarily difficult it 
can be to balance the duty to promote free speech with the duty to protect health and safety, 
particularly in the context of highly contentious issues where there are real and serious threats 
to health and safety.”251 Yet ultimately, the University of Southampton relied on the provi-
sions requiring it to ensure the safety and security of its staff, students and visitors, and ex-
pressed that it “was not an easy decision” but one that was conducted after “a full assessment 
of the University’s ability to manage these threats to individual safety and public order.”252 
The lobby groups applying pressure on the University of Southampton feared that the 
academic conference would be “an apparently one-sided event” that would not be far from 
descending “into naked antisemitism,”253 that it would be “a hate-fest, full of people who as-
sociate with dyed-in-the-wool antisemitism.”254 Many alumni of the University of Southamp-
ton were also upset with the University of Southampton potentially holding such a confer-
ence, promised to look “unfavorably” at job applications sent by graduates of Southampton 
and even returned their own Southampton diplomas as a sign of protest.
255
 A petition by Zion-
ist Federation UK gathered over 6700 signatures and urged the University of Southampton not 
to allow the academic conference “on the legitimacy of a state that was established over 60 
years ago,” as such conference would be “strange enough [to question the existence of Israel 
after so many years]”, “harmful,” a “disgrace,” and a “kangaroo court.”256 The organizers of 
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the academic conference were considerably upset by the cancellation of the academic confer-
ence:  
The University is a public space, it was established by a Royal Charter 
and it has public roles and duties including upholding freedom of speech 
and to that extent it should be able to resort to police assistance in order 
to curb security risks to enable it to fulfil its legal obligation to uphold 
freedom of speech. If this is not done, if commitment to safety is not un-
dertaken by the police, freedom of speech becomes an idle worthless no-
tion.
257
 
The University of Southampton was thus faced with initially the same dilemma that 
the government of France was faced with in respect of the Charlie Hebdo publishers:
258
 free-
dom of speech versus potential to offend and cause violence. Accordingly, the organizers of 
the academic conference used the situation revolving around Charlie Hebdo indeed as an 
analogy: 
Freedom of speech inherently involves taking risks, and hence the pres-
ence of risk cannot be used to curtail it! The UK Government and many 
other governments have refused to give in to attempts by Islamic extrem-
ists to stop the publication of pictures of Prophet Mohammad despite se-
rious risks of violence. The correct response by the governments was to 
confront and contain that violence and not to cancel the publication of 
these pictures by Charlie Hebdo and others.
259
 
Notably, over 915 academics from different well-known and lesser-known institutions 
from around the world have signed a statement in support of “the University of Southamp-
ton’s commitment to freedom of speech and scholarly debate” citing the affirmation “that the 
themes of the conference, such as the relationship of international law to the historic and on-
going political violence in Palestine/Israel, and critical reflections on nationality and self-
determination, are entirely legitimate subjects for debate and inquiry,” and expressing a con-
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cern “that partisan attempts are being made to silence dissenting analysis of the topic in ques-
tion” and that such censorship of a “lawful academic discussion would set a worrying prece-
dent.”260  
Whilst the University’s spokesperson underscored that “the University of Southamp-
ton is not expressing an opinion or taking any particular standpoint in relation to the confer-
ence, ‘International Law and the State of Israel’, but is fulfilling its legal obligations,”261 the 
reality remained at the moment of cancellation to be the contrary: censorship of a controver-
sial opinion.  
The fact, whether censorship is done at the pretense of law abidance, does not answer 
the fundamental question, whether such censorship was right, especially given the counter-
arguments that police enforcement could have apparently well secured the conference, the 
academics, and the attendees. The very same fact that there was a reasonable fear and risk of 
violent demonstrators protesting the controversial conference,
262
 however, suggests that the 
more powerful voice prevailed, by force, to suppress the expression of controversial opinions. 
Yet that is not what freedom of expression is about. It is even more telling that this cancella-
tion happened at an academic institution, canceling the conference of academics and profes-
sors, thereby completely trumping the principle of academic freedom, which should suppos-
edly be even more precious that simple freedom of expression.  
For the avoidance of doubt, in this section of the work, I did not set out to analyze or 
to agree with the organizers’ opinion on Israel’s right to exist. To me, it is understandable that 
many members of the Jewish community, which historically suffered from a lot of traumatiz-
ing antisemitism, were offended by the controversial views of the organizers of the academic 
conference. Yet, in my view, the situation should have been won or at least should have 
moved toward mutual understanding through words and arguments, a peaceful demonstration 
even, and perhaps through an alternative conference presenting opposing views, but definitely 
not through suppression of the speakers, a social media campaign, and political lobbying. 
Nevertheless, in practice and in the end, the latter methods did work well for the protesters of 
the Southampton conference. Thus, the present analysis showed that it is in practice possible 
to exploit the notion of human rights and human freedoms according to one’s own ideological 
understanding of such rights and freedoms. 
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3.4.2. Subconclusion to Southampton Conference Example of Expression  
becoming Offensive 
In this section, I will elaborate on the conclusion that, in the context of freedom of ex-
pression, at the inter-personal level it is possible to exploit the concept of human rights. The 
previously described canceled Southampton Conference of 2015 on Israel’s right to exist is 
only one of the instances where we may observe the clash of freedom of expression against 
the obligation not to offend.
263
  
Other notable example could have been made of the flag-burning, or the flag desecra-
tion, cases. In the United States, the proposed constitutional amendment to give the Congress 
power to prohibit physical desecration of the flag of the United States, has been a controver-
sial issue for over twenty years and has not been yet approved by the Senate. Notably, in Tex-
as v. Johnson
264
 and in United States v. Eichman,
265
 the Supreme Court of the United States 
ruled that flag burning is a constitutionally protected act of public expression and that we 
should be strong and resilient not to punish for difference in opinion: 
To paraphrase Justice Holmes, we submit that nobody can suppose that 
this one gesture of an unknown man will change our Nation’s attitude 
toward its flag. … We are tempted to say, in fact, that the flag’s deserv-
edly cherished place in our community will be strengthened, not weak-
ened, by our holding today. Our decision is a reaffirmation of the princi-
ples of freedom and inclusiveness that the flag best reflects, and of the 
conviction that our toleration of criticism such as Johnson’s is a sign and 
source of our strength. Indeed, one of the proudest images of our flag, the 
one immortalized in our own national anthem, is of the bombardment it 
survived at Fort McHenry. It is the Nation’s resilience, not its rigidity, 
that Texas sees reflected in the flag … . The way to preserve the flag’s 
special role is not to punish those who feel differently about these mat-
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ters. It is to persuade them that they are wrong.
266
 
Of course, the flag burning may be considered an extreme example of protecting free-
dom of speech and certainly not the only one.
267
 The nation’s flag is indeed a symbol with 
great value, and to take the example of the flag of the United States, it is also a symbol of 
courage and determination that was used in many battles in the past. This is why Justice John 
Paul Stevens dissented in Texas v. Johnson that the accused was supposedly punished only for 
the means by which he expressed his opinion, not the opinion itself.
268
 However, to repeat the 
Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Eichman, “the Government may not 
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or dis-
agreeable.”269 
On a theoretical level, the question of freedom of speech contrasting the concept of 
hate speech may be viewed in terms of utilitarianism. Yet, utilitarianism is rarely a good theo-
ry to approach a complex situation, where both sides of the story can be right in some respect. 
Pure utilitarianism, despite its pretense at objectivity, is not free from the subjectivity bias. In 
1974, Robert Nozick has made a convincing criticism of the utilitarian theory in that regard: 
Utilitarian theory is embarrassed by the possibility of utility monsters 
who get enormously greater sums of utility from any sacrifice of others 
than these others lose … . [T]he theory seems to require that we all be 
sacrificed in the monster’s maw, in order to increase total utility.270 
A utility monster is an overlooked byproduct of the utilitarian theory, since we all, to 
use the terminology of the theory itself, derive different utility units from different things. The 
problem arises, then, when someone derives considerably more units of utility from a certain 
act to the considerable detriment of others. Jason Kuznicki suggested in 2009 what would be 
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the result of providing such subjective well-being to certain utility monsters, even at the ex-
pense of free expression: 
The result is not more happiness, but a race to the bottom, in which ag-
grieved groups compete endlessly with one another for a slice of gov-
ernment power …. Restrictions on free expression do not make societies 
happier or more tolerant, but instead make them more fractious and cen-
sorious.
271
 
One can understand the silencing of free expression via the analogy to the press cen-
sorship. “[The press] is the spiritual mirror in which a people can see itself,”272 Karl Marx 
wrote in 1975. Marx relied on the idea that censorship is contrary to the nature of free press: 
The essence of the free press is the characterful, rational, moral essence 
of freedom. The character of the censored press is the characterless mon-
ster of freedom. …  n order to really justify censorship, the speaker … 
would have to prove that censorship is part of the essence of freedom of 
the press.
273
 
To finish this subsection with a quote from Kuznicki: 
Free speech [does not] need anything else to balance it, because in a free 
society, we may always balance “bad” speech with “good speech.” At-
tempting to balance free expression with censorship leads to a serious 
imbalance in political power.
274
 
That is also the argument here in this section: mala fide exploitation of certain human 
rights and freedoms means and leads to censorship, violence, and the use of power, ultimately 
to silence the other. Thus, using the example of freedom of speech turning into offense, the 
present analysis showed at the inter-personal level it is possible to ideologically exploit hu-
man rights and human freedoms to the detriment of others. 
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CONCLUSION 
The practice of law is in some sense a practice of interpretation, of justification, and of 
advocacy. It happens sometimes that lawyers and academics, and on a larger scale states and 
governments, have to go to remarkably great lengths to justify the legality and logic of certain 
actions, especially when doing so under the powerful peer pressure. Since legal arguments are 
rarely won by consensus, the judge, either real or hypothetical, reviewing the situation and 
different arguments, is posed with a hard choice to make. The difficult question to be an-
swered, naturally, is whose interpretation is to prevail.  
Difficulties arise when there is a perceivable gap between what people believe to be 
fair and between what law stipulates, on one hand, and between what the law stipulates and 
what the real practice is, on the other hand. In a very general sense, there are, thus, three lev-
els to be in harmony: the level of the idea of justice, the level of the law, and the level of prac-
tice. Ideally, the concept of justice should flow strongly through the medium of law right into 
the everyday real practice of humans and states. Such harmony, one can imagine, would be 
pleasant to observe, and, depending on the idea of justice, such society, where real practice is 
congruent with law that is in turn congruent with the idea of justice, would be pleasant to live 
in. 
However, it is often forgotten that law, as it is grounded in tradition and history, and, 
in particular, international law, as it is grounded in international custom and international his-
tory, do not always have strong links with the present time practice. The result is that human 
and state actions are bound to often blatantly defy law, as the real practice, pressures, and op-
portunities as well as the subjective sense of justice may have, in fact, dictated. Inevitably, for 
realist observers, there is felt an uneasy dissonance. 
In this work, after comprehensively explaining the methodological principles in Sec-
tions 1.1-1.2 and the interdisciplinary theoretical background in Sections 2.1.1-2.3.3, I laid out 
an original theoretical framework for understanding dissonances caused by ideological exploi-
tation of human rights on four different levels: intra-personal, intra-state, inter-state, and inter-
personal; with the latter two levels, in the interest of space and importance, warranting more 
attention than the former two levels.  
I was curious to falsify the set hypothesis: the concept of universal human rights is not 
prone to ideological exploitation. I have succeeded in falsifying the set hypothesis. I drew on 
powerful paradigms of constructivism and legal realism to propose an original and timely 
theoretical framework for understanding some dissonant events of the recent past that con-
cerned ideological exploitation of human rights. As examples of ideological exploitation of 
human rights, I have used the following: at the intra-personal level, I analyzed the clash of 
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human freedom against the freedom of others by referring to Anders Behring Breivik’s radical 
and violent Norway Attacks of 2011; at the intra-state level, I briefly analyzed the violation of 
human rights caused by the lustration policy during the Ukrainian crisis (2013 — ongoing); at 
the inter-state level, I have given a great deal of attention to the views of Russian Federation 
concerning the Crimean referendum of 2014; at the inter-personal level, I analyzed the cancel-
lation of the controversial Southampton Conference of March 2015 on Israel’s right to exist. 
In synergy, the analysis has shown that it is well possible to exploit and to twist the meaning 
of universal human rights. 
First, in Section 3.1, I concluded, as far as the Norway Attacks of 2011 were con-
cerned, that, when Anders Behring Breivik expressed radical views, he made a strong appeal 
to his own freedom, but in resorting to violence, he has self-contradicted his views by disre-
garding the liberty of others with no further justification for such disregard, even despite his 
radical contempt for certain cultures and nationalities. Thus, Breivik has ideologically and 
radically exploited the meaning of human freedom to the severe detriment of many others. 
Second, in Section 3.2, I concluded that Ukraine had a justification during the Ukrain-
ian crisis (2013 — ongoing) to adopt a lustration policy and to lay off government officials of 
the past, but it had no justification for such a harsh lustration policy that violated human rights 
of government officials and many judges simply because they were for the new ideology the 
resemblance of the old, conflicting ideology. It is thus well possible to exploit the meaning of 
human rights also at the intra-state level, if the governing ideology can justify such exploita-
tion. 
Third, in Sections 3.3.1-3.3.3, I explained the complexities of obtaining objective in-
formation regarding the Crimean Crisis (2014 — ongoing) and analyzed in detail key speech-
es of the President of Russian Federation Vladimir Putin that he made to address the Crimean 
Crisis. I reached a conclusion that many states might be pressed to choose defiance of interna-
tional law. Thus, I have shown that Russia, even if having disobeyed certain norms of cus-
tomary international law, had nonetheless its own justifications, backed up by power and al-
leged support of Crimean people, to intervention in Crimea. If there had been no such alleged 
support from Crimea itself, then we could have more effectively accused Russia of aggres-
sion. 
Finally, in Sections 3.4.1-3.4.2, I concluded that ideological exploitation of human 
rights can occur on the inter-personal level and often leads to censorship, violence, and the 
use of power, ultimately to silence the other. Thus, using the example of Southampton Con-
ference of March 2015 being canceled by forceful lobbying, my analysis showed that, given 
the power, it is possible to ideologically exploit human rights and human freedoms to the det-
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riment of others at the inter-personal level. 
In my thesis, I did not set out to overhaul the current human rights system.
275
 Howev-
er, I am very excited for the present work opening many possibilities for future research. One 
such question is the falsifiability of my proposed theory of fundamental dissonances for un-
derstanding ideological exploitation of human rights. Another unanswered question is the 
possibility of grounding human rights in natural law.
276
 Yet another such question is the ex-
ploration of options alternative to the human rights regime: could there be alternative re-
gimes? For example, Professor Eric A. Posner proposed, drawing on ideas on economic de-
velopment, that it would be better to focus on human welfare rather than on human rights.
277
 
Whether Posner’s suggestion is correct, it remains to be seen. As Mary Ann Glendon put it: 
Our rights talk, in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations, 
heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialog that might lead toward con-
sensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of common ground. In 
its silence concerning responsibilities, it seems to condone acceptance of 
the benefits of living in a democratic social welfare state, without accept-
ing the corresponding personal and civic obligations.
278
 
Mary Ann Glendon has also written, as her conclusion to a morbid description of the 
politics of the early 1990s, that, despite the struggle, certain groups, for example, “learned that 
they could enter into dialogue, find some common ground, and, where common ground did 
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not seem to exist, achieve mutual understanding — all without losing their own … distinc-
tiveness.”279 To have this kind of policy of mutual understanding instituted globally is also 
my hope. 
Finally, I understand why one would turn to the letter of law in times of need for legal 
justification. But if books are inconsistent with practice, does it not mean that books have dis-
tanced too far from reality? I would rather follow the wise words of Roscoe Pound, who cau-
tioned us to “not become legal monks” and “not allow our legal texts to acquire sanctity and 
go the way of all sacred writings,”280 than completely disregard the actual practice and behav-
ior of states, humans, and organizations. And until the actual practice becomes to obey the 
international human rights in a universally accepted or a globally understood way, which at 
the moment is an unrealistic expectation, the concept of universal human rights will continue 
to be exploited and twisted for the benefit of ever changing and often harmful ideologies. 
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RESÜMEE. Teoreetiline raamistik inimõiguste ideoloogilise ekspluateerimise  
mõistmiseks: fundamentaalsete dissonantside näited neljal eri tasandil 
 
Trend positivismile on võtnud hoogu juba 19. sajandi algusest. Kuid me kõik teame, 
mis juhtus maailmaga umbes sada aastat pärast seda: maailmasõjad, külm sõda, paljud vägi-
valdsed konfliktid. Rahu eest pidi seisma Ühinenud Rahvaste Organisatsioon ning rahu ja 
kindla tuleviku aluseks pidi olema 194 . aastal vastu võetud  nimõiguste Ülddeklaratsioon. 
Siiski ei näe maailm rahu ka tänapäeval. 
Mitmed skeptikud on tõstatanud küsimuse, kas inimõiguste süsteemil on mõni lahen-
damatu viga. Mõned on pakkunud välja uued süsteemid, mis näiteks ei keskenduks mitte 
inimõigustele, vaid inimarengule. Käesoleva töö autor ei ole seisukohal, et inimõiguste süs-
teem tuleb asendada mõne muu süsteemiga; ka on üldteada, et inimõiguste aktivism on too-
nud muuseas palju head. Kuid käesoleva töö autor kahtleb, kas inimõiguste süsteem suudab 
vastu pidada ühele autori seisukohal aktuaalsele ohule: ideoloogilisele ekspluateerimisele. 
Tegemist ei ole mitte ainult õigusfilosoofiliselt, vaid ka poliitiliselt olulise probleemiga.  
 utori hüpotees on järgmine: universaalseid inimõigusi ei ole võimalik ideoloogiliselt 
ekspluateerida. Oma töös falsifitseeris autor nimetatud hüpoteesi ning läbi mitmete aktuaalse-
te näidete jõudis järeldusele, et inimõigusi on võimalik ideoloogiliselt ekspluateerida ning 
seda on ka tihti tehtud inimeste või riikide kahjuks. 
Käesoleva töö struktureerimisel on lähtutud peatükkide ja alapeatükkide funktsiooni-
dest ja tähtsusest ning arusaamast, et korrektne, jälgitav ja kontrollitav teadustöö peab üld-
reeglina sisaldama muuhulgas ka metodoloogia ja teooria osa. Seega, töö koosneb kolmest 
peatükist, milleks on metodoloogia osa, baasteooria osa, ja näited. 
Töö esimene peatükk keskendub töö metodoloogiale ning seletab lahti põhilised me-
todoloogilised printsiibid, mida autor järgis käesoleva töö kirjutamisel: interdistsiplinaarsus ja 
falsifitseeritavus. Interdistsiplinaarsuse all pidas autor silmas teadvustamist, et õigusteadus ei 
ole mitte ainult õigusdogmaatika, vaid näiteks ka õiguse filosoofia, õiguse psühholoogia, õi-
guse sotsioloogia ja õiguse lingvistika, ja et sotsiaalteadus ei ole mitte ainult õigusteadus, vaid 
ka näiteks psühholoogia ja sotsioloogia laiemalt. Falsifitseeritavuse all pidas autor silmas Karl 
Popperi teadusmeetodit ning väidet, et teaduslikuks saab pidada ainult sellist teooriat, mis on 
falsifitseeritav või tagasilükatav. 
Töö teine peatükk keskendus töö teoreetilisele baasile: põhikontseptsioonidele ja põ-
hikontseptsioonide nõrkustele, interdistsiplinaarsetele teooriatele laiemalt, ja õigusteaduslike-
le teooriatele kitsamalt. Põhikontseptsioonideks on käesoleva töö raames õigus, poliitiline 
manipuleerimine, ideoloogia, võim, individualism, vabadus, suveräänsus ning inimõigused. 
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Kriitiline arusaam eelnimetatud kontseptsioonidest lubab väita, et inimõigused on ideoloogili-
selt ekspluateeritavad. Lähtudes aga interdistsiplinaarsuse printsiibist, autor tutvustas lähemalt 
ja rakendas analüüsi koostamisel autori poolt välja valitud kahte interdistsiplinaarset teooriat: 
Leon Festingeri kognitiivsete dissonantside teooriat psühholoogia valdkonnast ning Robert 
King Mertoni pingeteooriat sotsioloogia valdkonnast.  utori arvates põhjustavadki olukorrad, 
milles inimõigusi ideoloogiliselt ekspluateeritakse, selliseid kognitiivseid dissonantse, mida 
autor käesoleva töö raames nimetab fundamentaalseteks dissonantsideks, ning nende järgi 
võib selliseid ideoloogiliste ekspluateerimiste olukordi ära tunda. Pingeteooria võimaldab aga 
aru saada, miks üks või teine isik või riik võib olla sunnitud inimõigusi enda kasuks pöörama. 
Õiguslik-teoreetilisest küljest on aga käesolevas töös piirdutud kolmel lähenemisel: õigusrea-
lismil; arusaamal, et inimõigusi võidakse kasutada “moraalsete õiguste” tähenduses, kuigi 
neid on puudulikult kirja pandud kui positiivset õigust rahvusvahelistesse, 
supranatsionaalsetesse ja siseriiklikke õigusaktidesse; ning arusaamal, et universaalsed inim-
õigused on õigusaktides kajastatud pigem printsiipide kui reeglitena.  
Töö kolmas peatükk on jagatud neljaks, vastavalt autori välja pakutud jaotusele: fun-
damentaalsete dissonantside neli erinevat tasandit. Nendeks tasanditeks on järgmised inimin-
teraktsiooni variandid: isikusisene, riigisisene, riikidevaheline, ja isikutevaheline tasandid. 
Isikusisene tasand oli töös näitlikustatud läbi Norra 2011. aasta kuulsa juhtumi. Kirjel-
dades Anders Behring Breiviku plaanitud ja teostatud pommi seadmist Oslos peaministri hoo-
ne lähedale ja mitmete noorte tulistamist Utoya saarel poliitilise partei noortelaagris, autor 
jõudis järgmisele seisukohale: Breivik on kuritarvitanud oma inimõigusi vabale eneseteostu-
sele ning seeläbi sisemiselt ekspluateerinud inimõiguste tähendust oma radikaalse poliitilise 
ideoloogia elluviimisel, millega pani toime mitmed kuriteod ja põhjustas Norra elanikele va-
ralise ja mittevaralise kahju. Seega on isikusisene tasand ilmne siis, kui isik kuritarvitab enda-
le kuuluva moraalse õiguse. 
Riigisisene tasand oli töös näitlikustatud läbi Ukrainas 2014. aastal seoses sealse krii-
siga vastuvõetud lustratsiooni õigusakti. Lustratsiooni poliitika järgi pidid ametist lahkuma 
mitmed ametnikud, sealhulgas ka mitmed kohtunikud, ainuüksi seetõttu, et nad olid ametis 
kriisieelse valitsuse juures. Seega, lühikese analüüsi järel jõudis autor seisukohale, et ka riigi-
siseselt on inimõigusi võimalik ekspluateerida, kui seda õigustab või nõuab valitsev ideoloo-
gia. 
Riikidevaheline tasand oli töös näitlikustatud läbi eelmise teemaga seotud Krimmi 
kriisi.  utor analüüsis kolme Vene Föderatsiooni presidendi Vladimir Putini 2014. aasta kõ-
net, tuvastades neist kõnedest mitmed vastuolud rahvusvahelise õigusega.  utor jõudis järel-
dusele, et Vene Föderatsiooni president oli Vene Föderatsiooni esindajana teadlik rahvusvahe-
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lise õiguse normide eiramisest, kui Krimmi poolsaar jõudis faktiliselt Venemaa kontrolli alla, 
kuna rahvusvahelise õiguse norme eiratakse, kui seda õigustab ideoloogia, ka mujal maailmas 
ja kuna Venemaal olid omad ideoloogilised põhjused selleks, et Krimm enda kontrolli alla 
saada. Riikidevahelisel tasandil on seega inimõiguste ideoloogiline ekspluateerimine eriti sa-
gedane ja tihtipeale eriti vastuoluline, kuna reeglina süüdistavad konflikti mõlemad pooled 
teineteist inimõiguste rikkumises, ent rikuvad inimõigusi ka ise. 
Viimane, isikutevaheline tasand oli töös näitlikustatud läbi väljendusvabaduse solvata 
võivate avaldumisvormide probleemi. Käesoleval ajal oleks sellest probleemist ilmne näide 7. 
jaanuaril 2015. aastal Pariisis aset leidnud tulistamise juhtum kirjastuses “Charlie Hebdo”. 
Kuid autor valis näite, mis on vähem tuntud, ent samamoodi problemaatiline: märtsis 2015 
pidi Ühendkuningriikide Southamptoni Ülikoolis toimuma akadeemiline konverents  israeli 
eksistentsi õigustatuse teemal, mis pahandas mitmeid inimesi ja mille toimumine lõpuks tuge-
va surve ja lobi tagajärjel ülikooli administratsiooni poolt tühistati. Võtmata seisukohta kon-
verentsi teemal leidis autor siiski, et korraldajate ja osalejate inimõigust väljendusvabadusele 
oleks ülikool pidanud austama ning pigem rakendama politseijõudude abi, et ei oleks toimu-
nud vägivaldseid konflikte.  utor tõi argumendiks  meerika Ühendriikide riigilipu hävitami-
se kaasused, milles  meerika Ühendriikide Ülemkohus leidis, et kuigi on tegu solvava väl-
jendusvabaduse teostamisvormiga, on ühiskond piisavalt tugev, et austada õigust sellisele 
väljendusvabadusele.  sikutevahelisel tasandil on seega võimalik täheldada seda, et isik, tule-
nevalt vääradest arusaamadest utilitarismist, võib enda ideoloogiast lähtudes survestada teisi 
inimesi loobuma oma inimõigustest. 
Kokkuvõtteks, autori kinnitusel sai hüpotees, et universaalseid inimõigusi ei ole või-
malik ideoloogiliselt ekspluateerida, tagasi lükatud.  utor loodab, et käesolevas töös toodud 
metodoloogilised, teoreetilised ja analüütilised arusaamad innustavad Eestis edasist diskursust 
inimõiguste teemal ja aitavad kasvatada suuremat teadlikkust inimõiguste temaatikaga seotud 
probleemidest. Õigusfilosoofia tähtsust ei tohi alahinnata, kuna fundamentaalseid küsimusi 
küsides märkame ka fundamentaalseid probleeme.  utor loodab ka, et Tartu Ülikoolis, usku-
des, et Eesti sotsiaalteadlased ei unusta iial Eesti kui oma kodumaa keelt, hakatakse avaldama 
aina rohkem inglisekeelseid töid, et oleks võimalik pidada teaduslikku dialoogi ka teiste maa-
de socialia valdkonna teadlastega. 
 
04.05.2015                                               __________________ 
          Robert Suir 
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